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Introduction
For centuries, the suitability of the representative democracy as government system
has not been questioned at all. Although there have been two theories of representation
that have traditionally been distinguished, that is, the theory of likeness and the theory of
substitution, it is the latter that has been used to defend the best aptitude of politicians
against the citizens when making decisions. The theory of representation by likeness traces
its origins to Cratylus, the dialogue written by Plato in 360 B.C. According to this theory,
a representative should resemble what she represents. Thus, the existence of a similarity
between politicians and citizens becomes necessary when talking about representation of
the second by the first is pursued. As for the theory of representation by substitution,
it was first proposed by Edmund Burke in his work A Philosophical Enquiry into the
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, first published in 1757. According
to this theory, representation has to be understood as making present (again) what is
(now) absent. In other words, it is a substitute or replacement for something that is
absent. It is noteworthy that, unlike the previous case, this theory does not mention any
criteria (likeness or something similar) that must be satisfied for a politician to be the
representative of citizens. Implicitely, differences of varied nature between representatives
and represented are allowed. It has been taking advantage of this possibility that many
authors in both Economics and Political Science have relied on the assumption that
politicians have better information than ordinary citizens about what should be done at
any given time in order to support systems of political representation. Another advantage
of representative democracy manifested in the literature is the reduction of the risk of the
so-called “tyranny of the majority”, recognized by authors such as Alexis de Tocqueville
and John Stuart Mill, according to which a democratic majority would impose its will
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on a minority. Warning of the dangers of direct democracy, James Madison wrote in his
work Federalist 10 published in 1787: “It is of great importance... to guard one part of
the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in
different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of
the minority will be insecure.”
Life has been easy for representative democracy. Until now. The book Referendums:
A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, edited by David Butler and Austin Ranney
and published in 1978 by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is considered one of
the first attempts to collect the world experience with the instrument of the referendum.
This work tries to justify the growing dissatisfaction of the electorate with the actions of
the elected representatives through the increasing use of popular referendums in various
nations around the world. The editors are based on referendum studies held in Australia,
France, Ireland, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries, and the United States, among oth-
ers. Some years later and as a result of this work, Ranney published his work The Referen-
dum Device, whose review was included in American Political Science Review, one of the
journals with the highest impact index within the category of Political Sciences. This text
again analyzes the desire for referendums in democratic regimes. Referendums Around
the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (1994) and Referendums Around the
World: The Continued Growth of Direct Democracy (2014) constitute later reissues of
the work of Butler and Ranney. These texts continue to contribute to explain how refer-
endums were affecting the way of doing politics in those countries where the instrument
was most widespread.
The disaffection on the part of citizens with the system of political representation
has been increasingly growing over the last years. Such increase has caused that, in recent
times, certain sectors of society have ceased to see direct democracy as a mere comple-
ment to representative democracy and, instead, have begun to consider it as a potential
substitute. In fact, we are witnessing a rising trend in popularity levels of government
systems in which citizens are allowed to directly decide without the need for the tra-
ditional intermediation of politicians. The main purpose of this PhD dissertation is to
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approach the study of this phenomenon by comparing the systems of direct and represen-
tative democracy from a theoretical point of view. Faced with the undeniable success and
popular acceptance of instruments of direct democracy such as referendums and popular
consultations when making decisions, a very natural first question is when voters prefer
a system of direct democracy or a system of representative democracy. In Chapter 1 we
propose a model to investigate under which conditions voters prefer either one or the
other system. In direct democracies voters choose a policy among two alternatives, under
uncertainty about which policy better fits the realized state of the world; in representative
democracies voters select a candidate who, once elected, chooses a policy having observed
which is the realized state of the world. Voters and politicians’ payoffs depend on a com-
mon component which is positive only if the policy fits the state of the world, and on a
private ideological bias towards one of the policies. In direct democracies voters are un-
certain about the future state of the world, while in representative democracies they are
uncertain about the degree of ideological bias of the candidates, even if they know towards
which policy each candidate is biased. We show that representative democracy is pre-
ferred if (i) the majority of voters are pragmatic (the common component prevails), and
(ii) society is ideologically polarized, meaning that the majority of voters are ideological
(the private component prevails), but the median voter is pragmatic. Direct democracy is
the preferred instrument for collective choices in societies in which the majority of voters
and the median voter are ideological, implying that the majority of voters have the same
ideological bias, as, for instance, it occurs when the populist rhetoric of people against
the elite succeeds. Moreover, we find that the demand of direct democracy is increasing
in the polarization of the electorate, as long as no ideological group of voters becomes a
majority.
As might be expected, the aforementioned success of direct democracy is recently
resulting in the emergence of social movements and political parties asking for the di-
rect participation of citizens in the decision making process, which would allow people to
decide on each and every one of the issues that comes up for discussion. These groups
not only firmly defend the system of direct democracy but also show a strong opposition
to the system of representative democracy. Their main criticism is the possibility that
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politicians are self-seeking and end up behaving against people’s interest. In this sense,
they highlight the inability of representative democracy to implement what the majority
of people desires for each specific issue. While the suitability of such an outcome could be
discussed, we do not enter into this debate. We adopt instead a more positive approach
to the matter. We wonder whether indeed there is no room for representative democracy
to satisfy these groups’ aspirations, being fully necessary for such purpose to abandon the
traditional system of political representation and replace it by a system of direct democ-
racy. In Chapter 2 we study under which conditions the two aforementioned procedures
to make decisions may be equivalent in terms of the developed policies for each of the
considered issues. We propose a model in which there is a finite number of issues on which
a binary decision has to be made. In direct democracies voters directly vote for their more
preferred decision on each issue, so majority voting issue-by-issue is the outcome in these
systems. In representative democracies, we introduce a two-party system competition
where the political platforms of these parties are known. Candidates representing each of
the two parties will have these political platforms as the most preferred set of decisions
for the bundle of issues. However, preferences of parties’ candidates are not known, may
those varying from policy-motivated to office-motivated. This assumption captures the
essence of the criticism that systems of political representation are receiving related to
the risk of having politicians who only pursue their own interests. We find necessary and
sufficient conditions such that, irrespective from candidates’ preferences, decisions made
on each issue in representative democracies coincide with the decisions that would have
been chosen in direct democracies by majority voting issue-by-issue. These conditions
involve restrictions over pairs of preference profile of voters and political platforms of
candidates. While we will formally state them in Chapter 2, we offer here an intuition
of these conditions. First, there must be a degree of homogeneity among voters’ prefer-
ences about the suitability of the implementation of decisions yielded by majority voting
issue-by-issue such that this set of decisions is not defeated in pairwise comparisons by
any other set of decisions for the bundle of issues. This would allow that, any poten-
tially profitable deviation that might initially exist for any candidate would no longer
be beneficial. Second, either there must be at least one candidate whose party political
platform is in line with decisions made by majority voting on each issue, or there must
4
be full divergence of political platforms of parties.1 This double condition would allow,
respectively, either the existence of a candidate who trivially has no incentives to deviate
from what the majority of people desires for each issue, or the nonexistence of room for a
mutually beneficial agreement for both candidates which may violate the interests of the
majority.
Criticizing the opposite system by arguing the possible non-representativeness of the
majority’s preferences in its outcome is not something exclusive to those in favor of direct
democracy.2 Supporters of representative democracy question supporters of direct democ-
racy when the latter claim that direct democracy is the right system to achieve such
representativeness purpose. The former highlight the risk involved by the low turnout
when a referendum is held. It might be the case that some people decide not to pro-
nounce on a certain topic just because they are not interested on it. Participation thus
would become a problem: since not enough people voted to make the decision relevant,
it will be biased, not representing therefore the preferences of the majority. It is with
this argument that they continue to defend the figure of a representative in charge of
making decisions. However, supporters of direct democracy, far from giving up, rebut
that argument. According to them, the damage suffered by society when decisions are
made by self-seeking politicians could be even larger if the intensity of voters’ preferences
is taken into account: the politician might be choosing something that not only goes
against society’s preference, but something in fact “really bad” for a majority of voters.
A solution that seeks to reconcile the views of both sides is proposed in Chapter 3, where
we assess its performance according to a widely used principle for evaluating voting rules.
We assume that decisions are made by a committee through scoring rules. The composi-
tion of such committee perfectly represents the distribution of voters’ preferences over the
set of alternatives. Committee members cannot abstain, removing thus the risk of under-
representation warned by supporters of representative democracy, and they sincerely vote
1Of course, both conditions are compatible and may hold at the same time.
2As mentioned before, supporters of direct democracy criticize representative democracy as a result
of the possible non-representativeness of the will of the majority due to the risk of decisions being made
by self-seeking politicians.
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according to their preferences, being thus the outcome of the voting fully representative of
the preferences of the electorate, which meets the demands of supporters of direct democ-
racy. More specifically, we consider voting problems with an odd number of committee
members and single-peaked preferences. We study whether there are scoring rules that
are Condorcet consistent, that is, scoring rules that select, if exists, the alternative that
wins to any other alternative in pairwise comparisons. With only three alternatives, there
are scoring rules that yield the Condorcet winner only for committees of three and five
agents. With four or more alternatives, only committees of three agents work. In all these
scoring rules, the best and worst alternatives are assigned a score of 1 and 0, respectively,
and any middle alternative a score between 0 and 12 . For five or more alternatives, the
score of any middle alternative must be the same, and we call this family semiplurality
scoring rules.
After Chapter 3, a section containing the main conclusions obtained from the devel-
opment of the research objectives in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 is offered. Finally, a summary of
this dissertation in Spanish and a section with the referenced bibliography end this essay.
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Chapter 1
Demand Of Direct Democracy
This chapter has been published as:
Correa-Lopera, G. (2019). “Demand Of Direct Democracy”. European Journal of Political
Economy. DOI 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.08.004
1.1. Introduction
“We believe that major decisions can and should be legitimised by free and fair refer-
endum - not just at the national level, but also at the regional and local level... We stand
for direct democracy for the people. Let the peoples have their say!”.
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, a group in the European Parliament,
http://www.efddgroup.eu/about-us/direct-democracy, April 6, 2019.
For some years now, many social movements asking for a more direct participation of
citizens in the political process are emerging in several countries around the world. The
idea that decisions should be made by the citizens themselves rather than being delegated
to some elected representative is gaining supporters in recent times.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze under which conditions voters prefer represen-
tative democracy to direct democracy. In order to achieve our research goal we propose
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a model in which there are two possible policies, l (left) and r (right), to choose from.
One of these two policies is economically efficient, that is, it is the one that better fits
the realized state of the world. In direct democracy voters choose a policy among the
two alternatives, while in representative democracy voters select a candidate who, once
elected, chooses a policy having observed which is the realized state of the world. Voters
and politicians’ payoffs depend on a common component which is positive when the policy
fits the state of the world, and on a private ideological bias towards one of the policies.
We say that a voter (politician) is pragmatic when the common component prevails, while
she is ideological when the private component predominates. In direct democracy voters
are uncertain about the economically efficient policy, while in representative democracy
they are uncertain about whether candidates are pragmatic or ideological, even if they
know towards which policy each candidate is biased.
We find the conditions under which the majority of voters prefer a system of rep-
resentative democracy. In this system, the economically efficient policy is always imple-
mented with higher or equal ex-ante probability than in direct democracy. Consequently,
pragmatic voters always prefer a system of representative democracy. The first case in
which a society prefers a representative system is therefore when the majority of voters
are pragmatic. Since the majority of voters are interested in the implementation of the
economically efficient policy and politicians have better information about it, voters are
willing to delegate the decision making process to representatives. The second case in
which a system of representative democracy is preferred is when the majority of voters
are ideological but the median voter is pragmatic. This occurs when the electorate is ideo-
logically polarized between left and right. The intuition is the following. In this situation,
the policy chosen in a direct democracy is the one that, ex-ante, is economically efficient
with higher probability because the median voter is pragmatic. Assume, without loss of
generality, that such policy is l. Thus, voters who are ideologically biased towards policy r
along with pragmatic voters constitute a majority that continues to prefer representative
democracy. Overall, ideological voters biased towards the policy that is not chosen in
direct democracy prefer that the decision is made by an expert to try to avoid that the
outcome of the vote is opposite to the one that they wish: representative democracy thus
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constitutes a moderating element between both ideologically opposed sides.
On the other hand, societies in which the majority of voters and the median voter
are ideological, implying that the majority of voters have the same ideological bias, are
inclined to a system of direct democracy. The reason is that the members of this majority
group know what is their preferred policy, not needing the superior information available
from the experts. These voters have common aspirations that will remain invariant re-
gardless of what that information is. Thus, for this type of electorate a representative
system does not suppose any type of advantage against the direct democracy; arguably,
quite the reverse. Such majority of ideological voters are not willing to allow politicians to
make decisions because there exists the risk that they end up choosing something totally
different to their ambitions. This risk follows from the fact that with some positive proba-
bility the elected candidate is pragmatic and the policy different from the ideological bias
of these voters is economically efficient.
It is noteworthy that this configuration of the electorate is nothing but a society in
which there is a majority group of homogeneous voters in terms of their ideals and with
interests opposed to the minority group constituted by the rest of the citizens in that
society. In this sense, it is easy to directly connect our results with the populist rhetoric,
which has traditionally defended the mobilization of a majority (the people) against a
minority (the elite). Understanding this electorate as a populist society, we would be
offering a theoretical explanation for the growing interest in the use of instruments of
direct democracy shown by societies in which populist movements succeed.
Related Literature
Several papers express the benefits of using the instruments of direct democracy.
According to Besley and Coate (2008), policy outcomes on specific issues may differ
substantially from what the majority desires when citizens have only one vote to cast for
candidates who have to decide on a bundle of issues. They show that citizens’ initiatives
and referendums prevent such problems from occurring. Matsusaka (2005) states that
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allowing citizens to participate in lawmaking leads to the prevalence of the median voter’s
preferences along different dimensions and therefore reduces the discretionary performance
of the government. Empirical evidence on how direct democracy prevents politicians from
increasing spending to favor special interest groups is offered by Santerre (1989) and Sanz
(2015).
For its part, another strand in the literature highlights the inability of voters to make
decisions due to lack of information. The seminal works of Madison (1787) and Siéyès
(1789) stand up for the establishment of a representative democracy in which politicians
with an informational advantage decide. Having politicians better informed than voters
is a generally used assumption in the literature. The superior information available for
the politicians may be of diverse nature. Roemer (1994) and Cukierman and Tommasi
(1998) consider models where candidates are better informed than the electorate about
how different policies map into outcomes. Schultz (1996, 2002), Martinelli (2001), and
Jensen (2009) assume that politicians are better informed than voters about which is the
right policy to adopt depending on which is the realization of the state of the world.
In contrast, there is literature that raises the possibility that politicians do not use
this additional information for the benefit of citizens. Kartik and Preston McAfee (2007)
propose a model in which only a fraction of candidates are committed to implement the
policy that they consider to be the most appropriate to maximize the overall welfare of
society, even when such policy may not be the most popular among voters. They denote
this type of representatives as candidates “with character”. However, candidates “without
character” only seek to pander voters by carrying out the most popular policy, even
knowing that such policy is not the one that maximizes the social welfare. In this vein,
Morelli and Van Weelden (2013) introduce a parameter that measures the informational
advantage of politicians over voters about the true state of the world and relate it to the
probability of pandering by politicians. They find that the less informational advantage
politicians have, the greater their incentives to pander. This implies that an increase on
the information available to the voters can make all voters worse off since politicians are
now more likely to pander.
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Papers cited above dealing with either direct or representative democracy focus exclu-
sively on the analysis of one of these two systems, but without establishing a comparison
between them as we will do. Kessler (2005) proposes a model to study the advantages
of each of these regimes. Her findings are in line with the already pointed out benefits
of both systems: policies chosen through direct democracy are closer to the preferences
of the median voter, while policies chosen through representative democracy fit better to
the existing state of the world given the superior information of politicians. As far as we
know, Maskin and Tirole (2004) is the only paper in the literature that develops a the-
oretical analysis investigating the conditions for the suitability of each of these regimes.
Assuming that the goal is the maximization of the social welfare they study whether,
for that purpose, decisions should be made by the public directly, politicians subject to
reelection, or independent judges. In this sense, they develop a normative analysis about
the appropriateness of one or the other system. On the contrary, our purpose is to carry
out a predictive analysis: we aim to determine which system will be demanded by a
majority of voters.
In this sense, our paper also contributes to the literature about populism. There is
empirical evidence that shows that individuals who are dissatisfied with the system of
political representation are in favor of the use of instruments of direct democracy (Dal-
ton 2004; Pauwels 2014; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). This disaffection with
representative democracy systems is one of the fundamental basis of the rhetoric of pop-
ulism that repudiates the elite in power acting against the will of the people, demanding
consequently for the return of decision-making power to the ordinary citizens (Fieschi
and Heywood 2004). Voters with populist attitudes have been recently identified as those
sharing preferences for both anti-elitism and people-centrism (Rooduijn 2014; Rooduijn
et al. 2014). Mohrenberg et al. (2017) shows empirical evidence that those citizens with
populist attitudes support direct democracy more than other citizens. Guiso et al. (2017)
offers empirical evidence that the crisis of systemic economic security (mainly motivated
by threats of globalization and migration) that Western countries are experiencing in the
last decade undermines citizens’ confidence in traditional political parties and institutions.
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Instead, citizens would be prone to vote for a party with a populist rhetoric that calls
for the return of power to the people, which can be understood as a demand for direct
democracy. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to offer a theoretical justi-
fication about the reasons why a demand for direct democracy among citizens may exist.
Furthermore, following well-established arguments in the literature, we are able to equate
those societies that promote more direct citizen participation in the decision-making pro-
cess with societies with populist attitudes, thus providing a theoretical framework for
the empirical evidence about the successful of direct democracy among populist societies
already existing in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the model.
In Section 3 we derive equilibria under direct and representative democracy determining
so the outcome under each system. In Section 4 we carry out an analysis of voters’
expected utility in order to determine which of these systems is preferred by the majority
of the electorate. Finally, we discuss and conclude in Section 5. Appendix A offers some
explanatory notes. Appendix B provides the proofs of the results.
1.2. The Model
We study two voting systems: direct democracy and representative democracy. In
direct democracy, voters directly cast their ballots for an alternative. In representative
democracy, voters choose the representative, who will then choose the implemented policy.
Let N be a unitary mass of voters and X = {l, r} be the set of policies. Voters’
utility has two components: an ideological component, which represents the ideological
bias of each voter towards one of the policies, and a monetary component. The ideological
component is private while the monetary one is common to every voter and depends on
the realization of a random variable θ ∈ X which realizes after voters have voted. The
monetary utility of a policy x ∈ X is v > 0 if θ = x and zero otherwise. We then
refer to the policy that maximizes the monetary utility of each voter as the policy which
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is economically efficient. Representatives, but not voters, observe the realization of
θ. All voters have the same beliefs about which policy is economically efficient: l with
probability p and r with probability 1 − p, where p ∈ (0, 1).1 Formally, the utility of a
voter j ∈ N is given by:
uj(x, θ) = zj(x) + 1{θ = x}v (1.1)
where zj(x) is the ideological component and 1{θ = x}v is the monetary component in
which 1{θ = x} is an indicator function that takes unit value if the implemented policy
is economically efficient and zero otherwise. We impose no restrictions on zj(·), thereby
accommodating many situations.
Let bj = zj(r) − zj(l) for every j ∈ N , so that bj < 0 and bj > 0 reflect ideological
bias for l and r respectively. A voter j has no ideological bias if bj = 0. Voters’ biases
are distributed according to F (·) with a positive density function f(·) and median m. Let
bm = zm(r)− zm(l) denote the median voter’s bias.
Voters are either ideological or pragmatic. A voter j ∈ N is ideological if |bj| > v,
while she is pragmatic if |bj| ≤ v. Voter j is ideological if her bias is higher than the utility
derived from the economically efficient policy and pragmatic otherwise. An ideological
voter is concerned about the implementation of the policy towards which she is biased,
regardless of the economically efficient policy. In contrast, a pragmatic voter is interested
in the implementation of the economically efficient policy, regardless of her ideological
bias. This happens when the difference of utility between l and r is compensated by v.2
Let Λ be the set of voters with bj < −v, i.e., ideological voters biased towards l, and
λ > 0 be the proportion of these voters. Let P be the set of voters with bj > v, i.e.,
ideological voters biased towards r, and ρ > 0 be the proportion of these voters. Let Π be
1These probabilities are exogenous and common knowledge. Note that cases in which representative
democracy does not suppose a comparative advantage against direct democracy in terms of available
information, i.e., p = 0 and p = 1, are out of our range of interest since there would be no room for
delegation, so direct democracy would be trivially preferred.
2See Appendix A for a graphical explanation of both ideological biases and types of voters.
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the set of voters with −v ≤ bj ≤ v, i.e., pragmatic voters, and pi > 0 be the proportion
of these voters.3 Obviously, λ+ ρ+ pi = 1. We refer to (Λ,Π,P) as an electorate.
By abuse of language, we distinguish two types of electorate: ideological electorate
and pragmatic electorate. The electorate is ideological if the majority of voters are
ideological, while the electorate is pragmatic if the majority of voters are pragmatic.
Definition 1. The electorate is ideological if λ+ρ > 12 . Otherwise, it is pragmatic.
An ideological electorate is polarized if no ideological group constitutes a majority
by itself.
Definition 2. The electorate is polarized if λ+ ρ > 12 , λ <
1
2 , and ρ <
1
2 .
If the electorate is polarized, then it is also ideological but not necessarily the opposite.
In a representative democracy there are two candidates: let C = {L,R} denote the
set of candidates and c ∈ C a generic candidate. Both candidates are experts who observe
the realization of the random variable θ.4 The candidates have the same form of utility
functions as the voters.5 Candidate c’s utility is:
uc(x, θ) = zc(x) + 1{θ = x}v (1.2)
Let bc = zc(r) − zc(l) for both c ∈ C, which is interpreted as in the case of voters.
We assume that bL < 0 and bR > 0, so that candidate L is biased for l and candidate R
is biased for r. Candidates’ ideological bias is common knowledge.
Like voters, candidates can be ideological or pragmatic. A candidate c ∈ C is ideo-
logical if |bc| > v, while she is pragmatic if |bc| ≤ v. An ideological candidate always
3Note that λ, ρ, pi > 0 given that we assume a positive density function f(·).
4This is common knowledge.
5This assumption might be relaxed without affecting our results.
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prefers to implement the policy towards which she is biased regardless of the economically
efficient policy, while a pragmatic candidate always prefers to implement the economically
efficient policy. For each candidate c ∈ C, all voters believe that c is pragmatic with the
same probability µc ∈ (0, 1). These probabilities are exogenous and common knowledge.
The probability of being pragmatic is not necessarily equal for both candidates.
Direct Democracy
In direct democracy voters choose a policy and the one which is voted by a majority
is implemented, regardless of the realization of the random variable θ. Let xD ∈ X be
the policy implemented in this voting system.
Let Euj(xD, θ) denote the expected utility of a voter j ∈ N in direct democracy
when policy xD ∈ X is implemented. Equations (1.3) and (1.4) represent the cases xD = l
and xD = r respectively.
Euj(l, θ) = zj(l) + pv (1.3)
Euj(r, θ) = zj(r) + (1− p)v (1.4)
Each voter j ∈ N will cast her ballot for the policy (l or r) which maximizes her
expected utility.
Representative Democracy
In representative democracy voters choose a candidate and the one which is voted by
a majority is selected. Let cI ∈ C be the candidate selected in this voting system.6 The
winning candidate observes θ and implements the policy that maximizes her utility.
6For notational simplicity, we also refer to representative democracy as indirect democracy, so we use
letter I in order to avoid confusion with the notation R used for candidates.
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Let Euj(cI , θ) denote the expected utility of a voter j ∈ N in representative
democracy when candidate cI ∈ C is selected and such candidate implements the policy
that maximizes her utility. Equations (1.5) and (1.6) represent the cases cI = L and
cI = R respectively.
Euj(L, θ) = (1− p)µL
(
v + bj
)
+ pv + zj(l) (1.5)
Euj(R, θ) = pµR
(
v − bj
)
+ (1− p)v + zj(r) (1.6)
Each voter j ∈ N votes for the candidate (L or R) which maximizes her expected
utility.
1.3. Equilibria
We consider rational voters who vote for the alternative (a policy in direct democracy
and a candidate in representative democracy) that they prefer. In case of being indifferent,
we assume that they vote for the status quo alternative which, without loss of generality,
we assume being policy l and candidate L respectively. In order to determine the outcome
in each system, we identify an indifferent voter and the median voter whose preference
determines the outcome. The indifferent voter in direct democracy, iD, is the voter who
is indifferent between policies l and r, i.e., EuiD(l, θ) = EuiD(r, θ). The indifferent voter
in representative democracy, iI , is the voter who is indifferent between candidates L and
R, i.e., EuiI (L, θ) = EuiI (R, θ).
Lemmata 1 and 2 characterize the indifferent voter in both systems. Proofs of these
Lemmata are in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. In direct democracy, a voter j ∈ N is indifferent between l and r if and
only if bj = v(2p− 1) ≡ biD . Every voter j such that bj < biD (bj > biD) votes for policy l
(r).
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If p > 12 (p <
1
2), then biD > 0 (biD < 0): if policy l (r) is more likely to be
economically efficient, then the indifferent voter in direct democracy must be ideological
biased towards policy r (l). Clearly, if p = 12 , the indifferent voter has no ideological bias.
Lemma 2. In representative democracy, a voter j ∈ N is indifferent between L and
R if and only if bj =
v
(
2p−1−pµR+(1−p)µL
)
1−pµR−(1−p)µL ≡ biI . Every voter j such that bj < biI (bj > biI )
votes for candidate L (R).
The indifferent voter in representative democracy depends on the probability of each
policy to be economically efficient (as in the case of direct democracy) and the voters’
beliefs about candidates, namely whether they are pragmatic or ideological (µL, µR). A
comparative statics analysis reveals that if candidate L is more likely to be pragmatic
(µL > µR) and policy l is more likely to be economically efficient (p > 12), then a prag-
matic voter votes for candidate L since the ex-ante probability of having the economically
efficient policy implemented is higher. Analogous interpretation applies for the case in
which µL < µR and p < 12 . Suppose that, as before, candidate L is more likely to be
pragmatic, but now policy r is more likely to be economically efficient (p < 12). Then, a
pragmatic voter votes for candidate R only when the probability of her ideological bias
(i.e., policy r) being economically efficient is high enough to offset the risk entailed when
voting a candidate who is ex-ante more likely to be ideological.
Understanding the behavior of a pragmatic voter becomes relevant given the fact
that the indifferent voters in direct and representative democracy are always pragmatic.
Lemma 3 states this result. Its proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 3. For every p ∈ (0, 1), v ≥ 0, and µc ∈ (0, 1) where c ∈ C, both the
indifferent voters in direct and representative democracy are pragmatic.
A voter who is indifferent between candidates in a representative system may strictly
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prefer a policy in direct democracy. As we have shown in Lemma 1, a comparison between
bj and biD reveals the policy voted by j in direct democracy. By studying the relationship
between biI and biD we can know the policy voted by iI . Lemma 4 shows that the outcomes
of this analysis depend on the voters’ beliefs about the pragmatism of candidates. The
proof of this Lemma is in Appendix B.
Lemma 4. The indifferent voter in representative democracy iI votes for policy l (r)
in direct democracy if µL ≤ µR (µL > µR), for every p ∈ (0, 1).
By Lemma 3 we know that iI is pragmatic. Consider the case in which candidate R
is more likely to be pragmatic (µL < µR). By Lemma 4, we know that iI votes for policy
l in direct democracy (i.e., biI < biD). Figure 1.1 shows this situation. Here, a pragmatic
voter who votes for policy l in direct democracy may end up voting for candidate R in
representative democracy even though the ideological bias of such candidate is a policy
different from the one that she prefers in direct democracy (see the dotted area in Figure
1.1). The reason is that selecting a candidate who, ex-ante, is more likely to implement the
economically efficient policy generates an increase on the expected utility of pragmatic
voters and such increase could be high enough to compensate for the risk that such
candidate would eventually be ideological. Analogous interpretation applies to the case
µL > µR. When µL = µR, both candidates are perceived by voters as equally likely to be
pragmatic. Their ideological biases are therefore the only differentiating factor between
candidates, so saying that a voter is indifferent between L and R is equivalent to say that
such voter is indifferent between l and r.7
7We remind that in case of indifference between policies a voter votes for the status quo alternative
in direct democracy, i.e., policy l.
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Figure 1.1 – Case µL < µR and p ∈ (0, 1)
It is well-known that in a majoritarian voting system, the most preferred alternative
by the median voter is selected. Lemma 5 states, for each possible configuration of
parameters bm, biD , and biI , the policy and the candidate that are selected in one and
another system respectively. The proof for this result directly follows from Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. The outcomes in direct and representative democracy are:
(i) if bm ∈
(
−∞,min{biD , biI}
]
, then xD = l and cI = L,
(ii) if bm ∈
(
max{biD , biI}, ∞
)
, then xD = r and cI = R, and
(iii) if bm ∈
(
min{biD , biI}, max{biD , biI}
]
, then:
(iii.i) xD = l and cI = R if biI < biD , while
(iii.ii) xD = r and cI = L if biI > biD .
By Lemma 5 we have that if biD = biI , then the selected candidate in representative
democracy is the one whose ideological bias coincides with the policy that would be chosen
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in direct democracy. By Lemma 4 we know that this happens when voters believe that
both candidates are equally likely to be pragmatic. However, this does not necessarily
happen when biD 6= biI . In that case, the selected candidate in representative democracy
could be ideologically biased towards the policy that is not chosen in direct democracy.
Assume, without loss of generality, that biI < biD (case illustrated in Figure 1.1). Suppose
that bm ∈ (biI , biD ]. Note that the median voter is pragmatic since |bm| ≤ v.8 In direct
democracy, policy l is chosen, while candidate R is selected in representative democracy.
It is not risky to claim that this situation represents a society in which a majority of
voters show an interest by the implementation of the economically efficient policy: even
though R’s ideological bias is not the policy l, the median voter decides to vote for her
since she is more likely to be pragmatic.
1.4. Electorate’s Preference on Systems
Will voters incline towards direct democracy or representative democracy? The pur-
pose of this section is to determine which is the system preferred by the majority of voters
given the uncertainty about both the economically efficient policy and the pragmatism of
each candidate. The answer hinges on the median voter. We compare the median voter’s
expected utility under direct democracy (i.e., the utility before a policy is selected) with
her expected utility under representative democracy (i.e., the utility before a candidate is
selected). We say that representative democracy is preferred to direct democracy by the
majority of voters if Eum(xD, θ) ≤ Eum(cI , θ). Proposition 1 shows that the preferred
voting system depends on both the type of the electorate and the type of the median
voter of the distribution of voters’ biases. The proof of this proposition is in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. If the electorate is pragmatic, then representative democracy is the
system preferred by the majority of voters. If the electorate is ideological, then:
(i) if the median voter is pragmatic, representative democracy is the system preferred
8By Lemma 3 we have that |biD |, |biI | ≤ v, so if bm ∈ (biI , biD ], then |bm| ≤ v trivially holds.
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by the majority of voters, while
(ii) if the median voter is ideological, direct democracy is the system preferred by the
majority of voters.
Corollary 1 directly follows from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Representative democracy is the system preferred by the majority of
voters if and only if the median voter is pragmatic.
From Proposition 1 we can distinguish three different situations.
When the electorate is pragmatic, a majority of voters are pragmatic and they prefer
that the decision on which policy to implement be made by an expert. In fact, in repre-
sentative democracy the economically efficient policy is always implemented with higher
or equal ex-ante probability than in direct democracy. Note that here the median voter
is necessarily pragmatic.
When the electorate is ideological and the median voter is pragmatic, a majority of
voters are ideological but neither ideological voters biased towards l nor ideological voters
biased towards r constitute a majority by themselves. This is what we call a polarized
electorate. The fact that a society in which the majority of voters are not concerned
about the economically efficient policy ends up preferring to delegate decisions on a can-
didate may seem, at first glance, counterintuitive. The polarization of the electorate
between l and r is playing a key role in this. Since the median voter is pragmatic, in a di-
rect democracy the policy that ex-ante is economically efficient with higher probability is
chosen. Note that, due to the ideological polarization of the electorate, there is a group of
voters who are dissatisfied with the outcome of direct democracy, that is, those ideological
voters who are biased towards the policy that is not chosen in such system. Therefore,
these voters prefer to delegate decisions to experts who may select their preferred policy
with positive probability. Thus, in this situation there exists a majority coalition of voters
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supporting the representative democracy composed by the group of pragmatic voters and
a group of ideological voters. For its part, the group of ideological voters who are biased
towards the policy that is chosen in direct democracy clearly prefer that system. Such
proportion of voters who are satisfied with direct democracy could be interpreted as a
measure of the demand of direct democracy in the electorate. Proposition 2 shows how a
shift in the distribution of voters’ biases can increase the demand of direct democracy.
Proposition 2. Let (Λ,Π,P) and (Λ′,Π′,P′) be two polarized electorates such that
Λ ⊆ Λ′, P ⊆ P′ with at least one strict inclusion, and min{λ′, ρ′} ≥ max{λ, ρ}. Then,
the demand of direct democracy from (Λ,Π,P) to (Λ′,Π′,P′) increases.
Proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward and is omitted. From (Λ,Π,P) to (Λ′,Π′,P′),
a fraction of initially pragmatic voters (i.e., voters in Π) becomes ideological. Since the
cardinality of both groups of ideological voters in (Λ′,Π′,P′) is at least as high as the
cardinality of the largest ideological group in (Λ,Π,P) and is necessarily one of these two
groups that will demand direct democracy, the demand of direct democracy increases.
It is noticeable that a shift in the distribution of voters’ biases as the one proposed in
Proposition 2 is consistent with the definition of polarization increase offered by Esteban
and Ray (1994). Corollary 2 directly follows from Proposition 2 and this observation.
Corollary 2. The demand of direct democracy is increasing in electorate’s polariza-
tion.
From Corollary 2 follows that when the electorate is polarized and therefore repre-
sentative democracy is still the system preferred by the majority of voters, an increase in
the polarization of the electorate increases the demand of direct democracy.
Finally, when the electorate is ideological and the median voter is ideological, a
majority of voters are ideological and furthermore one of the ideological groups constitutes
a majority by itself. Since at least 50% of voters are interested in the implementation
of an specific policy regardless of which policy is the economically efficient one, direct
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democracy is the preferred system. It allows voters to implement whatever policy they
desire, thus preventing a candidate from ending up implementing a different policy. This
is where our results connect with literature about populist movements. Traditionally,
populist movements have been understood as the mobilization of a majority (the people)
against a minority (the elite). The majority group composed by ideological voters all
biased towards the same policy would constitute the majority that, according to a theory
of populism, shares common aspirations and aims at achieving them at all costs (Guiso
et al. 2017). For its part, the rest of voters on that society (that is, ideological voters
biased towards the opposite policy and pragmatic voters) would constitute the minority
that does not present the same ambitions as the majority group, motivating thus the
confrontation between both groups and capturing therefore the essence of the populism
(Akkerman et al. 2014).
1.5. Conclusion
When a decision has to be made, voters may prefer to directly decide or delegate to
informed representatives. We have proposed a model to study when voters would show
a predisposition towards one or another option. We find that the preference of a society
to be governed by a system of direct or representative democracy depends on both the
type of the electorate and the type of the median voter. As long as the electorate is
pragmatic, representative democracy is the preferred system. The informational advan-
tage of representatives is enough for an electorate concerned about the implementation
of the economically efficient policy to have incentives to delegate. When the electorate is
ideological, though, we have to look at the type of the median voter in order to determine
the preferred system. If the electorate is ideological and the median voter is pragmatic,
then representative democracy is the preferred system. Since no ideological group has a
strict majority in the society, a system of political representation is preferred even when
the majority of voters are ideological. Although there is a majority of voters who do not
care about what is economically efficient, there is no consensus among all of them on
what action should be carried out. Instead, there exists a clear division of the electorate
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into two groups defending opposing policies. This situation in which neither of these two
groups constitutes a majority by itself is what we have identified as a polarized electorate.
As a consequence of this polarization, whatever the outcome in direct democracy is, there
is always a group of ideological voters who oppose such a policy. Trying to avoid that
something opposed to their own ideological bias is chosen, the group of ideological voters
biased towards the policy that would not be chosen in direct democracy prefers to delegate
their vote to representatives. These ideological voters, along with the existing pragmatic
voters in the society, constitute a majority coalition in favour of the representative democ-
racy. Moreover, the demand of direct democracy is increasing in the polarization of the
electorate, as long as no ideological group becomes a majority. On the contrary, when an
ideological group becomes a majority, and therefore both electorate and median voter are
ideological, direct democracy is the preferred system. This is a society in which there is
a majority of voters who do not care about what is economically efficient and agree on
what decision should be made. Such an electorate prefers a system that guarantees the
implementation of the policy that they desire, rather than running the risk of allowing
a representative to choose. This situation is what we have associated with societies in
which populist movements have been successful. In this way, our model predicts that an
increase in populism will increase the demand for direct democracy.
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1.6. Appendix A
Figure 1.2 shows how a voter j who is ideologically biased towards a certain policy
could be either pragmatic or ideological depending on whether the magnitude of such bias
is greater or less than the monetary utility in absolute terms.
Figure 1.2 – Ideologically biased pragmatic or ideological voter
Consider a voter j such that bj < −v. Since bj < 0 (i.e., zj(r) < zj(l)), we know that
voter j is ideologically biased towards policy l. In addition, when bj < −v, the difference
between the ideological component evaluated in l and the ideological component evaluated
in r is so large that it cannot be compensated by the monetary component of the utility
function. Thus, voter j is concerned about the implementation of policy l, regardless
what the economically efficient policy is. Note that, by symmetry, a voter j such that
bj > v will be concerned about the implementation of policy r above all things. For this
reason, in both cases we say that voter j is ideological. Consider now a voter j such that
−v ≤ bj < 0. In this case, voter j is still ideologically biased towards policy l. However,
here the utility derived from the monetary component when the economically efficient
policy is implemented is larger than the difference between the ideological component
evaluated in l and the ideological component evaluated in r. This implies that, although
voter j is still ideologically biased towards policy l, she ends up preferring policy r when
it is the economically efficient policy. By symmetry, a voter j such that 0 < bj ≤ v will
prefer policy l when it is economically efficient, even though she is ideologically biased
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towards policy r (i.e., bj > 0). Consequently, we refer to voter j as pragmatic voter in
both cases.
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1.7. Appendix B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Let iD be such that:
EuiD(l, θ) = EuiD(r, θ) (1.7)
From Equation (1.3) we have that the expected utility of iD when policy l is imple-
mented is:
EuiD(l, θ) = ziD(l) + pv (1.8)
and, from Equation (1.4), the expected utility of iD when policy r is implemented is:
EuiD(r, θ) = ziD(r) + (1− p)v (1.9)
By substituting (1.8) and (1.9) in (1.7) such condition can be rewritten as:
ziD(l) + pv = ziD(r) + (1− p)v
⇔ ziD(r)− ziD(l) = v(2p− 1)
⇔ biD = v(2p− 1)
(1.10)
Consider now a voter j ∈ N such that bj < biD . Note that this condition is equivalent
to:
bj < v(2p− 1)
⇔ zj(r)− zj(l) < v(2p− 1)
⇔ Euj(l, θ) > Euj(r, θ)
(1.11)
which implies that the expected utility of j when policy l is implemented is higher than
her expected utility when policy r is implemented. Therefore, voter j votes for policy l.
By symmetry, if bj > biD , then voter j votes for policy r.

PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Let iI be such that:
EuiI (L, θ) = EuiI (R, θ) (1.12)
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From Equation (1.5) we have that the expected utility of iI when the candidate L is
elected is:
EuiI (L, θ) = (1− p)µL
(
v + biI
)
+ pv + ziI (l) (1.13)
and, from Equation (1.6), the expected utility of iI when the candidate R is elected is:
EuiI (R, θ) = pµR
(
v − biI
)
+ (1− p)v + ziI (r) (1.14)
By substituting (1.13) and (1.14) in (1.12) such condition can be rewritten as:
(1− p)µL
(
v + biI
)
+ pv + ziI (l) = pµR
(
v − biI
)
+ (1− p)v + ziI (r)
⇔ ziI (r)− ziI (l) =
v
(
2p− 1− pµR + (1− p)µL
)
1− pµR − (1− p)µL
⇔ biI =
v
(
2p− 1− pµR + (1− p)µL
)
1− pµR − (1− p)µL
(1.15)
Consider now a voter j ∈ N such that bj < biI . Note that this condition is equivalent
to:
bj <
v
(
2p− 1− pµR + (1− p)µL
)
1− pµR − (1− p)µL
⇔ zj(r)− zj(l) <
v
(
2p− 1− pµR + (1− p)µL
)
1− pµR − (1− p)µL
⇔ EuiI (L, θ) > EuiI (R, θ)
(1.16)
which implies that the expected utility of j when candidate L is elected is higher than her
expected utility when candidate R is elected. Therefore, voter j votes for candidate L. By
symmetry, if bj > biI , then voter j votes for candidate R.

PROOF OF LEMMA 3. We divide this proof into two parts:
First, we prove that |biD | ≤ v, or equivalently, |v(2p − 1)| ≤ v. Note that this is
equivalent to prove that conditions (1) and (2) hold:
(1) v(2p− 1) ≤ v, which holds since p ≤ 1 is always the case.
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(2) v(2p− 1) ≥ −v , which holds since p ≥ 0 is always the case.
Hence, we have that |v(2p− 1)| ≤ v for all p ∈ (0, 1) and v ≥ 0.
Second, we prove that |biI | ≤ v, or equivalently,
∣∣∣∣∣∣v
(
2p−1−pµR+(1−p)µL
)
1−pµR−(1−p)µL
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ v. Note
that this is equivalent to prove that conditions (3) and (4) hold:
(3)
v
(
2p−1−pµR+(1−p)µL
)
1−pµR−(1−p)µL ≤ v
(4)
v
(
2p−1−pµR+(1−p)µL
)
1−pµR−(1−p)µL ≥ −v
We distinguish three cases depending on the values of µL and µR. We show that
conditions (3) and (4) hold for each of these cases:
a. Suppose that µL = µR. Then, conditions (3) and (4) are equivalent to con-
ditions (1) and (2) respectively. Therefore, they hold for all p ∈ (0, 1) and
v ≥ 0.
b. Suppose that µL < µR. Then, condition (3) requires that µL ≤ 1, and condition
(4) requires that µR ≤ 1, which are always the case. Therefore, they hold for
all p ∈ (0, 1) and v ≥ 0.
c. Suppose that µL > µR. By symmetry to case b., conditions (3) and (4) also
hold for all p ∈ (0, 1) and v ≥ 0.
Hence, we have that
∣∣∣∣∣∣v
(
2p−1−pµR+(1−p)µL
)
1−pµR−(1−p)µL
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ v for all p ∈ (0, 1), v ≥ 0 and every
µc ∈ (0, 1) where c ∈ C.

PROOF OF LEMMA 4. By Lemma 1 we know that the relationship between
biI and biD reveals the policy voted by iI . Let p ∈ (0, 1). First, notice that biI = biD ≡
v(2p− 1) (i.e., iI is indifferent between l and r in direct democracy) when µL = µR. Now
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assume, without loss of generality, that biI < biD (i.e., iI votes for l in direct democracy).
By Lemmas 1 and 2, this condition can be rewritten as:
v
(
2p− 1− pµR + (1− p)µL
)
1− pµR − (1− p)µL < v(2p− 1) (1.17)
which holds when:
µL < µR (1.18)
By symmetry, biI > biD (i.e., iI votes for r in direct democracy) when µL > µR.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We divide this proof into two parts.
First, we study which is the system preferred by the majority of voters. We distin-
guish three cases, which correspond to the cases identified in Lemma 5. For each
of these cases, we compare the expected utility of the median voter in direct and
representative democracy.
Case 1. Suppose that bm ∈
(
− ∞,min{biD , biI}
]
. Then representative democracy is
preferred to direct democracy if:
Eum(l, θ) ≤ Eum(L, θ)
⇔ zm(l) + pv ≤ (1− p)µL
(
v + bm
)
+ pv + zm(l)
⇔ bm ≥ −v
(1.19)
Case 2. Suppose that bm ∈
(
max{biD , biI}, ∞
)
. Then representative democracy is
preferred to direct democracy if:
Eum(r, θ) ≤ Eum(R, θ)
⇔ zm(r) + (1− p)v ≤ pµR
(
v − bm
)
+ (1− p)v + zm(r)
⇔ bm ≤ v
(1.20)
Case 3. Suppose that bm ∈
(
min{biD , biI}, max{biD , biI}
]
and:
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(3.1) biI < biD . Then representative democracy is preferred to direct democracy
if:
Eum(l, θ) ≤ Eum(R, θ)
⇔ zm(l) + pv ≤ pµR
(
v − bm
)
+ (1− p)v + zm(r)
⇔ bm ≥
v
(
− 1 + p(2− µR)
)
1− pµR
(1.21)
which always holds in the considered interval (biI , biD ] since
v
(
−1+p(2−µR)
)
1−pµR ≤
biI for all p ∈ (0, 1), v ≥ 0, and µc ∈ (0, 1) where c ∈ C. Therefore, we have
that representative democracy is preferred to direct democracy throughout
the interval (biI , biD ].
(3.2) biI > biD . Then representative democracy is preferred to direct democracy
if:
Eum(r, θ) ≤ Eum(L, θ)
⇔ zm(r) + (1− p)v ≤ (1− p)µL
(
v + bm
)
+ pv + zm(l)
⇔ bm ≤
v
(
− 1 + 2p+ (1− p)µL
)
1− (1− p)µL
(1.22)
which always holds in the considered interval (biD , biI ] since biI ≤
v
(
−1+2p+(1−p)µL
)
1−(1−p)µL
for all p ∈ (0, 1), v ≥ 0, and µc ∈ (0, 1) where c ∈ C. Therefore, we have
that representative democracy is preferred to direct democracy throughout
the interval (biD , biI ].
Note that, by Lemma 3, |biD | ≤ v and |biI | ≤ v. Thus, from Cases 1, 2, and 3 it
is derived that representative democracy is the system preferred by the majority of
voters as long as |bm| ≤ v. Equivalently, representative democracy is the system
preferred by the majority of voters if the median voter is pragmatic, while direct
democracy is the system preferred by the majority of voters if the median voter is
ideological.
31
Second, we study the preference for one or another system depending on the type
of the electorate.
i. Pragmatic electorate. By definition, the electorate is pragmatic if the majority
of voters are pragmatic. This is equivalent to say that pi ≥ 0.5. Consequently,
λ + ρ ≤ 0.5. Given that λ, ρ > 0, the previous condition implies that λ, ρ <
0.5. Therefore, the median voter of the distribution will necessarily belong
to the proportion of voters denoted by pi. In other words, if the electorate is
pragmatic, then the median voter is necessarily pragmatic. From Cases 1, 2,
and 3 above we know that representative democracy is the system preferred
by the majority of voters if the median voter is pragmatic. Thus, we conclude
that if the electorate is pragmatic, then representative democracy is the system
preferred by the majority of voters.
ii. Ideological electorate. By definition, the electorate is ideological if the majority
of voters are ideological. This is equivalent to say that λ + ρ > 0.5. Con-
sequently, pi < 0.5. In this case, the median voter is not necessarily either
pragmatic or ideological. The type of the median voter depends on the specific
configuration of parameters λ and ρ as follows:
◦ Assume that λ+ ρ > 0.5. Therefore, the electorate is ideological. If either
λ ≥ 0.5 or ρ ≥ 0.5, then the median voter belongs to the proportion of
voters denoted by either λ or ρ respectively. In other words, the median
voter is ideological. From Cases 1, 2, and 3 above we know that direct
democracy is the system preferred by the majority of voters if the median
voter is ideological. Thus, we conclude that if the electorate is ideological
and the median voter is ideological, then direct democracy is the system
preferred by the majority of voters.
◦ Assume that λ+ρ > 0.5. Therefore, the electorate is ideological. If λ < 0.5
and ρ < 0.5, then the median voter belongs to the proportion of voters
denoted by pi. In other words, the median voter is pragmatic. From Cases
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1, 2, and 3 above we know that representative democracy is the system
preferred by the majority of voters if the median voter is pragmatic. Thus,
we conclude that if the electorate is ideological and the median voter is
pragmatic, then representative democracy is the system preferred by the
majority of voters.

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Chapter 2
Implementing Direct Democracy Via
Representation
2.1. Introduction
“Ordinary citizens will become protagonists, abandoning the current system of dele-
gate democracy in the hands of politicians... We are not a party, we are not a caste, one
man, one vote, one man, one vote”.
Five Star Movement, an Italian Political Movement, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2019/feb/13/digital-political-parties-democratic-m5s, February 13,
2019.
A significant phenomenon in current society is the emergence of social movements
with an anti-representative democracy rhetoric. These groups criticize systems based on
power delegation due mainly to the risk of politicians being self-seeking and ending up be-
having against people’s interest. They claim the need for direct participation of citizens in
the decision making process to guarantee the representativeness of society’s preferences in
the final outcome. As a result of the recent success of this discourse among the population,
the emergence of political parties in favor of direct democracy has become a generalized
fact in Europe, having those arised in several countries. Freedom and Direct Democracy
in Czech Republic, Alternative for Germany in Germany, Five Star Movement in Italy,
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Podemos in Spain, Direktdemokraterna in Sweden, and Something New in United King-
dom are just some examples of parties demanding the right of people to decide directly
by using direct democracy instruments such as referendums and popular consultations.
These organizations defend that citizens should be able to decide on each and every one
of the issues that comes up for discussion. When decisions about several issues have to
be made, these political parties demand that, for each of these issues, it should be carried
out what the majority of people desires for such specific issue.
Claims of these corporations about the need to shift towards a system of direct
democracy in order to achieve such outcome could be interpreted as an omen about the
inability of representative democracy to implement what the majority of people desires
for each specific issue. We develop a positive analysis of this matter. The purpose of this
paper is to study whether there is some room for representative democracy to implement
the majority preferences on each issue or, on the contrary, it is totally necessary for such
end to abandon the traditional system of political representation and replace it by a
system of direct democracy. As far as we know, Coffman (2016) is the only paper in the
literature that develops a theoretical analysis investigating the conditions under which
representative democracy implements the choices made by people in direct democracy.
The author considers the existence of a single issue for which there are a finite number of
alternatives. She focuses on the case where the decision made in direct democracy leads to
a strict ordering of these alternatives and looks for conditions under which the candidate
with this ordering is elected. On the contrary, we consider that there are a finite number
of issues for each of which a binary choice has to be made. We aim to find conditions
under which decisions for each issue that people would have made, one at a time, by
independent referendums are implemented by the elected candidate when she decides for
the bundle of issues. To this extent, our paper delimits a problem that, until now, had
been attributed to any representative democracy. Besley and Coate (2008) show that, as
a consequence of the bundling of issues that is inherent when electing a representative,
policies that diverge far from what the majority desire may be implemented on specific
issues by the elected politician. Assuming that the goal is the prevalence of the median
voter’s preferences, the authors argue that this error of representative democracy would
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create a role for citizens’ initiatives. In this sense, we identify societies in which such
bundling of issues does not result in representative democracies implementing socially
undesirable outcomes, thus not being necessary to resort to the direct participation of
citizens.
Formally, we investigate whether there are necessary and sufficient conditions such
that decisions made on each issue in a representative democracy coincide with the decisions
that would have been chosen in a direct democracy by majority voting issue-by-issue. We
propose a model in which there are a finite number of issues on which a binary decision
has to be made. For convenience, we assume that there are no complementarities among
issues, so the order in which decisions on different issues are made has no effect on the
choice made for each issue. In direct democracy, voters directly vote for their more
preferred decision on each issue, so majority voting issue-by-issue is the outcome in these
systems. In representative democracy, we introduce a two-party system competition where
the political platforms of these parties are known. Candidates representing each of the
two parties will have these political platforms as the most preferred set of decisions for the
bundle of issues. Candidates also have preference for being in office. Unlike for preferences
over issues, preference for being in office is not known, may thus candidates’ preferences
vary from policy-motivated to office-motivated. This assumption captures the essence of
the criticism that systems of political representation are receiving from groups in favor
of direct democracy related to the risk of having politicians who only pursue their own
interests.
We find conditions that guarantee that, irrespective from candidates’ preferences,
representative democracy coincides with direct democracy. These necessary and suffi-
cient conditions involve restrictions over pairs of preference profile of voters and political
platforms of candidates. First, there must be no set of decisions for the bundle of issues
such that is preferred by a majority of voters to the set of decisions yielded by majority
voting issue-by-issue. In other words, the outcome of majority voting issue-by-issue has
to be a Condorcet winner relative to the voters’ preference profile on the bundle of issues.
This would allow that, any potentially profitable deviation that might initially exist for
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any candidate would no longer be beneficial. Second, either there must be at least one
candidate such that her most preferred set of decisions for the bundle of issues coincides
with the outcome of majority voting on each issue, or candidates’ preferences are such
that there is no issue for which both candidates share their more preferred decision.1
This double condition would allow, respectively, either the existence of a candidate who
trivially has no incentives to deviate from what the majority of people desires for each
issue, or the nonexistence of room for a mutually beneficial agreement for both candidates
which may violate the interests of the majority.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 presents the results along with their corresponding proofs, as well as an interpre-
tation of them. Section 4 offers a discussion about the divergence of results in direct and
representative democracy when our conditions are not met. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2.2. The Model
There are q issues and for each of them a binary decision has to be made. Let
K = {1, ..., q} be the set of issues and k ∈ K an arbitrary issue. Let x =
(
x1, ..., xq
)
be
a vector of decisions on q issues where xk ∈ {−1, 1} denotes the decision for issue k. We
call a vector x an alternative and A ≡ {−1, 1}q the set of alternatives.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be an odd finite set of voters. Each voter i ∈ N has strict
separable preferences defined over the set of alternatives, which means that for each
issue k her most preferred decision remains invariant regardless of the decisions for all
the other issues. This implies that for each issue k a voter i has either −1 or 1 as
her most preferred decision for such specific issue.2 For voter i ∈ N , let Pi be the set
of all strict separable preference relations defined on A, with typical element Pi. Let
1Of course, both conditions are compatible and may hold at the same time.
2See Le Breton and Sen (1999) for a deep understanding on how every strict separable preference
relation over the set of alternatives induces a unique strict preference relation over each issue.
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PN = (P1, ..., Pn) be a voters’ preference profile. Given a preference profile of voters,
let xkmaj(PN) ∈ {−1, 1} be the decision preferred by a majority of voters for issue k and
xmaj(PN) =
(
x1maj(PN), ..., x
q
maj(PN)
)
∈ A the alternative for which the decision on each
issue k is made by majority voting. We say that an alternative is a Condorcet winner
relative to the voters’ preference profile when no other alternative defeats it in pairwise
comparisons. Formally:
Definition 1. An alternative y ∈ A is a Condorcet winner at PN if there is
no z ∈ A such that # {i ∈ N / z Pi y} > n2 .
Let L and R be two candidates, each representing a different political party. We
denote the set of candidates by C = {L,R}. We introduce the electoral game played by
these candidates. Knowing the preference profile of voters, each candidate announces an
alternative, which is the one that she implements in case of winning the election. Let
mL and mR be the announced alternatives by candidates L and R respectively where
mL,mR ∈ A. Once alternatives have been announced, each voter sincerely votes for the
candidate who announces a more preferred alternative. When candidates announce differ-
ent alternatives, having an odd number of voters with strict preferences over alternatives
implies that one of the two candidates necessarily wins the election. However, when the
announced alternatives are the same, both candidates would be equally likely to win the
election. We refer to this situation as a “tie” between candidates.3 We use wL or wR
to denote that candidate L or candidate R wins the election and tie for the coinciding
announcements case. Let O = {wL, tie, wR} be the set of office-outcomes. Candidates
have preferences over the set of alternatives and also for being in office. We define an
electoral-outcome as a pair of office-outcome and alternative. Let E ≡ O×A be the set of
electoral-outcomes, with typical element (o;x) where o ∈ O and x ∈ A. Candidates have
separable preferences defined over the set E . Additionally, preference for being in office
implies that given any alternative x, each candidate prefers to win rather than to tie and
to tie rather than to lose.4 For candidate c ∈ C, let Pc be the set of all these preference
3For each voter, the decision on which candidate to vote for is comparable to a coin-flipping game.
4The term to lose refers to the case in which the opponent candidate wins.
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relations defined on E , with typical element Pc. Let PC = (PL, PR) be a candidates’
preference profile. For convenience, we refer to the most preferred alternative on A of
each candidate as her “top”. Given a preference profile of candidates, let τL and τR be
the tops of candidates L and R respectively where τL, τR ∈ A. For each candidate c ∈ C,
let τc =
(
τ 1c , ..., τ
q
c
)
where τ kc ∈ {−1, 1} is the decision preferred by candidate c for issue
k ∈ K.
Definition 2. Given a pair of tops (τL, τR), we say that a preference profile of
candidates PC is consistent with (τL, τR) if τL(PL) = τL and τR(PR) = τR.
Note that different preference profiles of candidates can generate the same pair of tops
(τL, τR).5 We highlight the situation in which, issue by issue, the most preferred decision of
one of the candidates is the opposite to the most preferred decision of the other candidate.
We refer to this condition as maximal top-differentiation between candidates.
Definition 3. We say that candidates are maximally top-differentiated when,
for each issue, the most preferred decision of candidate L is the opposite to the most
preferred decision of candidate R. Formally, τL = −τR.
While preferences of voters are known, about candidates only their respective tops
are known. Thus, a society in our context is defined by a preference profile of voters and
a pair of tops of candidates. Let the triplet (PN , τL, τR) define a society. Our aim is to
study when in a representative democracy where candidates play the electoral game, the
decision made for each issue coincides with the decisions that would have been chosen in
a direct democracy where voters directly vote over each single issue. We focus on Nash
5Let PC = (PL, PR) and P ′C = (P ′L, P ′R) be two preference profiles of candidates such that PL = P ′L,
which clearly implies that τL(PL) = τL(P ′L), while PR 6= P ′R, with (i) τR(PR) = τR(P ′R); (ii) for each
y, z ∈ A, (wR; y) PR (tie; z), and (iii) for each y, z ∈ A such that (wR; y) P ′R (wR; z), we have that (wL; y)
P ′R (wR; z). Even when at both PR and P ′R candidate R has the same top, at PR she is office-motivated
since she gives priority to be in office regardless of the policy to be carried out, while at P ′R she is
policy-motivated since she is willing to refuse to be in office as long as a certain policy was implemented.
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Equilibrium concept of the electoral game.
Definition 4. Given a society (PN , τL, τR) and a preference profile of candidates PC
consistent with (τL, τR), we say that announcements mL and mR constitute a Nash
Equilibrium of the electoral game if no candidate c ∈ C has incentives to deviate
and announce some m′c ∈ A \ {mc}.
2.3. On When Representative Democracy Equals Di-
rect Democracy: The Results
For every possible society, our purpose is to find under which conditions xmaj(PN) is
the unique Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game for each preference profile of
candidates which is consistent with (τL, τR).
Lemma 1 states that, if there is a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game, then both
candidates are announcing the same alternative. Intuitively, it is easy to see why a situa-
tion in which different alternatives are announced cannot be sustained as equilibrium. If
this would be the case, we know that the candidate announcing a more preferred alterna-
tive by a majority of voters wins the election and carries out her announced alternative.
By preference for being in office, the losing candidate has incentives to deviate and an-
nounce the same alternative as the winning candidate since, given the implementation of
such alternative, this candidate prefers to tie rather than to lose.
Lemma 1. If announcements mL and mR constitute a Nash Equilibrium of the
electoral game, then both candidates announce the same alternative.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., let mL = y and mR = z where y 6= z and y, z ∈ A such
that mL and mR are a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game. Suppose, without loss of
generality, that (wL; y) is the obtained electoral-outcome after voting by voters. Consider
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candidate R. Let m′R ∈ A such that m′R = y. Note that, if candidate R deviates and
announces m′R = y, then (tie; y) is the resulting electoral-outcome. By preference for
being in office, (tie; y) PR (wL; y), so announcing m′R = y is a profitable deviation for
candidate R when mL = y. Therefore, mL and mR are not a Nash Equilibrium of the
electoral game.

We now identify a necessary condition for having xmaj(PN) as the unique Nash Equi-
librium outcome of the electoral game. Proposition 1 states that only if xmaj(PN) is a
Condorcet winner, there is room for the achievement of such purpose.
Proposition 1. Given any society (PN , τL, τR), suppose that xmaj(PN) is the unique
Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game for every PC consistent with (τL, τR).
Then xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner at PN .
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that for some society xmaj(PN) is not a Condorcet
winner at PN . Then, there exists y ∈ A such that # {i ∈ N / y Pi xmaj(PN)} > n2 .
Let PC = (PL, PR) be a candidates’ preference profile consistent with (τL, τR) such that,
for at least one of the candidates, say L, PL ∈ PL and, for each h, s ∈ A, we have
(wL;h) PL (tie; s). By Lemma 1, we know that, mL = mR = xmaj(PN) is the only
Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game. Let m′L ∈ A be such that m′L = y. Since
# {i ∈ N / y Pi xmaj(PN)} > n2 , (wL; y) is the resulting electoral-outcome when m′L and
mR are the candidates’ announcements. By assumption, (wL; y) PL (tie;xmaj(PN)), so
announcing m′L = y is a profitable deviation for candidate L when mR = xmaj(PN), which
contradicts that mL and mR) is a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game.

Proposition 2 shows that having xmaj(PN) as a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the elec-
toral game is guaranteed when the issue-by-issue majority voting outcome is a Condorcet
winner.
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Proposition 2. Let (PN , τL, τR) be a society such that xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet
winner at PN . Then, xmaj(PN) is a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game for
every PC consistent with (τL, τR).
Proof. Let mL = mR = xmaj(PN). Note that (tie;xmaj(PN)) is the resulting
electoral-outcome for these announcements. Since xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner at
PN , for each m′L ∈ A \ {xmaj(PN)}, (wR;xmaj(PN)) is the resulting electoral-outcome
when m′L and mR are the candidates’ announcements. By preference for being in office,
(tie;xmaj(PN)) PL (wR;xmaj(PN)), so announcing m′L is not a profitable deviation for
candidate L when mR = xmaj(PN). The analysis for candidate R follows an analogous
reasoning. Therefore, mL and mR are a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game.

Theorem 1 states necessary and sufficient conditions for the issue-by-issue majority
voting outcome, that is, xmaj(PN), to be the unique Nash Equilibrium outcome of the
electoral game.
Theorem 1. Given any society (PN , τL, τR), xmaj(PN) is the unique Nash Equilib-
rium outcome of the electoral game for every PC consistent with (τL, τR) if and only if
xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner at PN and:
(i) xmaj(PN) = τc for some c ∈ C, or
(ii) candidates are maximally top-differentiated.
Proof. We prove this theorem by showing the following two claims.
CLAIM 1 (Necessity). If xmaj(PN) is the unique Nash Equilibrium outcome of the
electoral game for every PC consistent with (τL, τR) then xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner
at PN and (i) xmaj(PN) = τc for some c ∈ C, or (ii) candidates are maximally top-
differentiated.
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That xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner at PN follows from Proposition 1. By contradic-
tion, suppose that neither (i) xmaj(PN) = τc for some c ∈ C, nor (ii) candidates are maxi-
mally top-differentiated. Then, (1) τ rL = −xrmaj(PN) for some r ∈ K, (2) τ sR = −xsmaj(PN)
for some s ∈ K, and (3) τ tL = τ tR for some t ∈ K. Next, we show that there exists some
y ∈ A \ {xmaj(PN)} such that mL = mR = y is a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game
for some PC consistent with (τL, τR). We distinguish two cases:
Case 1. τ tL = τ tR = −xtmaj(PN) for some t ∈ K.
Suppose, without loss of generality, τ tL = τ tR = 1 and xtmaj(PN) = −1. Let Y = {Y ∈
A : yt = −xtmaj(PN) = 1}. By construction, xmaj(PN) /∈ Y . Let PC = (PL, PR) be
a candidates’ preference profile consistent with (τL, τR) such that, for each y ∈ Y
and z ∈ A \ Y , we have (wR; y) PL (wL; z) and (wL; y) PR (wR; z). Let h ∈ Y
be such that for each k ∈ K \ {t}, hk = xkmaj(PN). Since h ∈ Y we know that
ht = −xtmaj(PN) = 1, so clearly h 6= xmaj(PN). We now show that mL = mR = h
is a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game. Note that (tie;h) is the resulting
electoral-outcome. Observe that candidate L has no incentives to deviate to some
z ∈ A\Y since by assumption (wR;h) PL (wL; z) and by preference for being in office
(tie;h) PL (wL; z). Thus, candidate L would only consider deviations to alternatives
that belong to the set Y . Let m′L ∈ Y such that m′L = g where g ∈ Y \ {h}. Since
g 6= h, there exists at least k ∈ K \ {t} such that gk 6= hk. By construction,
hk = xkmaj(PN) while gk = −xkmaj(PN). Since xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner,
by separability of voters’ preferences we have # {i ∈ N / h Pi g} > n2 . Hence,
(wR;h) is the resulting electoral-outcome when m′L and mR are the candidates’
announcements. By preference for being in office (tie;h) PL (wR;h), so announcing
m′L = g is not a profitable deviation for candidate L when mR = h. The analysis
for candidate R follows an analogous reasoning. Therefore, mL and mR are a Nash
Equilibrium of the electoral game.
Case 2. For every t ∈ K with τ tL = τ tR we have τ tL = τ tR = xtmaj(PN).
43
Then, from points (1), (2), and (3), τ rL = −xrmaj(PN) = −τ rR for some r ∈ K,
and τ sR = −xsmaj(PN) = −τ sL for some s ∈ K. Suppose, without loss of generality,
τ rL = 1, xrmaj(PN) = τ rR = −1, τ sR = 1, and xsmaj(PN) = τ sL = −1. Let Q =
{Q ∈ A : qr = τ rL = −xrmaj(PN) = 1 and qs = τ sR = −xsmaj(PN) = 1}. By
construction, xmaj(PN) /∈ Q. Let PC = (PL, PR) be a candidates’ preference profile
consistent with (τL, τR) such that, for each q ∈ Q and z ∈ A \ Q, we have (wR; q)
PL (wL; z) and (wL; q) PR (wR; z). Let h ∈ Q be such that for each k ∈ K \ {r, s},
hk = xkmaj(PN). Since h ∈ Q we know that hr = τ rL = −xrmaj(PN) = 1 and hs =
τ sR = −xsmaj(PN) = 1, so clearly h 6= xmaj(PN). We now show that mL = mR = h
is a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game. Note that (tie;h) is the resulting
electoral-outcome. Observe that candidate L has no incentives to deviate to some
z ∈ A\Q since by assumption (wR;h) PL (wL; z) and by preference for being in office
(tie;h) PL (wL; z). Thus, candidate L would only consider deviations to alternatives
that belong to the set Q. Let m′L ∈ Q such that m′L = g where g ∈ Q \ {h}. Since
g 6= h, there exists at least k ∈ K \ {r, s} such that gk 6= hk. By construction,
hk = xkmaj(PN) while gk = −xkmaj(PN). Since xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner,
by separability of voters’ preferences we have # {i ∈ N / h Pi g} > n2 . Hence,
(wR;h) is the resulting electoral-outcome when m′L and mR are the candidates’
announcements. By preference for being in office (tie;h) PL (wR;h), so announcing
m′L = g is not a profitable deviation for candidate L when mR = h. The analysis
for candidate R follows an analogous reasoning. Therefore, mL and mR are a Nash
Equilibrium of the electoral game.
CLAIM 2 (Sufficiency). If xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner at PN and (i) xmaj(PN) =
τc for some c ∈ C, or (ii) candidates are maximally top-differentiated, then xmaj(PN) is
the unique Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game for every PC consistent with
(τL, τR).
That xmaj(PN) is a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game for each prefer-
ence profile of candidates consistent with (τL, τR) follows from Proposition 2. It remains
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to be shown that it is unique. By contradiction, suppose that there exists a Nash Equilib-
rium of the electoral game such that xmaj(PN) is not the resulting outcome. From Lemma
1 we have that there are mL and mR such that mL = mR = y where y ∈ A \ {xmaj(PN)}
which are a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game with (tie; y) as the resulting electoral-
outcome. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1. xmaj(PN) = τc for some c ∈ C.
Assume, without loss of generality, that τL = xmaj(PN). Let m′L = xmaj(PN). Since
xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner, (wL;xmaj(PN)) is the resulting electoral-outcome
when m′L and mR are the candidates’ announcements. By preference for being
in office and separability of candidates’ preferences, (wL;xmaj(PN)) PL (tie; y), so
announcing m′L = xmaj(PN) is a profitable deviation for candidate L when mR = y.
Therefore, mL = y and mR = y are not a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game.
Case 2. Candidates are maximally top-differentiated.
We distinguish two subcases:
• Subcase 2.1. For some c ∈ C, τc = xmaj(PN).
We come back to Case 1.
• Subcase 2.2. For each c ∈ C, τc 6= xmaj(PN).
We distinguish two subsubcases:
◦ Subsubcase 2.2.1. For some c ∈ C, τc = mc = y.
Assume, without loss of generality, that τL = mL = y. By maximal
top-differentiation, y = −τR. Let m′R = xmaj(PN). Since xmaj(PN) is a
Condorcet winner, (wR;xmaj(PN)) is the resulting electoral-outcome when
mL and m′R are the candidates’ announcements. By preference for being
in office and separability of candidates’ preferences, (wR;xmaj(PN)) PR
(tie;−τR), so announcing m′R = xmaj(PN) is a profitable deviation for
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candidate R when mL = y. Therefore, mL = y and mR = y are not a
Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game.
◦ Subsubcase 2.2.2. For each c ∈ C, τc 6= mc = y.
Since y 6= xmaj(PN) by construction, there exists at least h ∈ K such
that yh 6= xhmaj(PN). Assume, without loss of generality, that yh = 1 and
xhmaj(PN) = −1. Furthermore, by maximal top-differentiation, we know
that τhL = −τhR. Assume, without loss of generality, that τhL = yh = 1
and τhR = xhmaj(PN) = −1. Let m′R = m˜R where for each k ∈ K \ {h},
m˜kR = yk and for h ∈ K, m˜hR = −yh = xhmaj(PN) = −1. Since xmaj(PN) is
a Condorcet winner, by separability of voters’ preferences we have # {i ∈
N / m˜R Pi y} > n2 . Thus, (wR; m˜R) is the resulting electoral-outcome when
mL = y and m′R = m˜R are the candidates’ announcements. Note that
m˜hR = τhR. By preference for being in office and separability of candidates’
preferences, (wR; m˜R) PR (tie; y), so announcing m′R = m˜R is a profitable
deviation for candidate R when mL = y. Therefore, mL = y and mR = y
are not a Nash Equilibrium of the electoral game.

Theorem 1 identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for the two considered proce-
dures to make decisions, that is, by direct vote of voters over each single issue or allowing
that decisions are made in a electoral game, to be equivalent in terms of the decision
made for each issue when tops of candidates is all that is known about their preferences.
We explain now why conditions in Theorem 1 are necessary and sufficient for having the
outcome of direct democracy as the unique Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral
game in representative democracy.
We start by proving necessity. When xmaj(PN) is not a Condorcet winner, the exis-
tence of a Nash Equilibrium with xmaj(PN) as outcome is not guaranteed. Suppose that
there is a candidate who is office-motivated.6 Since xmaj(PN) is not a Condorcet winner,
6Office-motivation is understood as the preference of the electoral-outcome in which the candidate
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there is at least one alternative that defeats xmaj(PN) in pairwise comparison. Thus,
the office-motivated candidate has incentives to deviate and announce some alternative
which is preferred to xmaj(PN) by a majority of voters. This would allow her to win the
election, which is the most important for such candidate regardless of the alternative to
be implemented. For its part, when neither there is a candidate with xmaj(PN) as top nor
candidates are maximally top-differentiated, the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium with
xmaj(PN) as outcome is not guaranteed. Assume that the tops of both candidates are
equal and different from xmaj(PN). Suppose that both candidates are policy-motivated.7
Then, the top of these candidates, which is different from xmaj(PN), can be sustained as
a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game.
We show now sufficiency of the conditions. Assume first that xmaj(PN) is a Con-
dorcet winner and there is at least one candidate with xmaj(PN) as top. Existence of the
equilibrium is guaranteed since both candidates announcing xmaj(PN) is a Nash Equilib-
rium of the electoral game. By Lemma 1, candidates announce the same alternative in
equilibrium. Note that the tie between candidates and the implementation of xmaj(PN)
is the electoral-outcome in this case. Since xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner, no candidate
has incentives to deviate and announce a different alternative. In case of doing so, the
deviant candidate loses the election while her opponent wins and carries out the alterna-
tive xmaj(PN). But, by preference for being in office, such candidate prefers to tie and
implement xmaj(PN) rather than losing having still that alternative implemented, so no
candidate has a profitable deviation. To show uniqueness of the equilibrium, suppose
that both candidates are announcing a same alternative but different from xmaj(PN).
Announcing xmaj(PN) is a profitable deviation for the candidate with such alternative as
top: if she announces xmaj(PN), she wins the election and carries out her top, which is the
best possible scenario for such candidate. Therefore, no alternative other than xmaj(PN)
wins and her least preferred alternative is carried out over the electoral-outcome in which she ties and
her top is implemented.
7Policy-motivation is understood as the preference of the electoral-outcome in which the candidate
loses and her top is carried out over the electoral-outcome in which she wins and her second most preferred
alternative is implemented.
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can be sustained as a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game. Assume now that
xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner and candidates are maximally top-differentiated. Exis-
tence of the equilibrium is similar to the previous case. For the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium, suppose again that both candidates are announcing a same alternative but different
from xmaj(PN). Consider one issue for which the decision announced by candidates is
different from the decision included in xmaj(PN). By maximal top-differentiation, there is
necessarily a candidate that, for such issue, has the decision contained by xmaj(PN) on it
as her most preferred decision. Consider a variant of the alternative initially announced
by the candidates, in which decisions announced for all the issues remain the same as at
the beginning except for the issue at hand, which would now become the decision specified
by xmaj(PN). Note that, if the above candidate announces this modified alternative wins
the election and carries out such alternative. By separability of preferences and prefer-
ence for being in office, this electoral-outcome is preferred by this candidate to the initial
electoral-outcome in which she tied and an alternative more distant from her top was
carried out. Thus, there is a candidate with a profitable deviation so no alternative other
than xmaj(PN) can be sustained as a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game.
2.4. What If Our Conditions Are Not Met? A Dis-
cussion
Necessity and sufficiency of our conditions implies that, as long as at least one of them
is not fulfilled, the equivalence between direct democracy and representative democracy in
terms of outcomes ceases to exist. In this section, we describe the different outcomes that
are obtained in both systems when any of the conditions is not met and offer a discussion
about the suitability of each of these regimes when decisions derived from each of them
do not coincide.
Several criticisms of decisions made in direct democracy have been identified in the
literature. The Sen’s Liberal Paradox (Amartya, 1970) states that respecting individual
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preferences of voters in each issue may lead to a Pareto dominated outcome. In our con-
text, this paradox implies that there would be some set of decisions for the bundle of
issues (i.e., an alternative) that is preferred by every voter to the set of decisions yielded
from majority voting issue-by-issue. A slightly less worrisome problem in terms of so-
cial efficiency but still relevant is the Ostrogorski’s Paradox (Ostrogorski, 1970, Rae and
Daudt, 1976). These authors find that choosing issue-by-issue by majority rule when de-
cisions are dichotomous may result in a majority defeated overall outcome. There would
be therefore an alternative that is preferred by a majority of voters to xmaj(PN). Related
to Ostrogorski’s Paradox is Anscombe’s Paradox (Anscombe, 1976). It says that when de-
cisions involving dichotomous choices are made by majority rule on each issue, a majority
of voters could disagree in a majority of issues. Having the majority voting issue-by-issue
output (i.e., xmaj(PN)) as a Condorcet winner guarantees that none of these paradoxes
is occurring, so it could be said that the outcome of direct democracy is desirable in
this case. Assume that xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner relative to the voters’ prefer-
ence profile PN but neither there is a candidate with xmaj(PN) as top nor candidates are
maximally top-differentiated. It can be argued that, under this framework, direct democ-
racy is recommendable. Direct democracy is ensuring the representativeness of society’s
preferences in the final outcome currently demanded by numerous social movements and
political parties, having furthermore such outcome no criticism from a social welfare per-
spective. Thus, a natural requirement to state that representative democracy works well
is to also provide xmaj(PN) as a result. However, even when the majority voting issue-
by-issue will be a Nash Equilibrium outcome of the electoral game, an alternative other
than xmaj(PN) could be also sustained as an equilibrium of the game: by Proposition 2
we know that xmaj(PN) being Condorcet winner is a sufficient condition for the existence
of a Nash Equilibrium with xmaj(PN) as outcome, while uniqueness of such equilibrium is
not guaranteed due to not having neither a candidate with xmaj(PN) as top nor maximal
top-differentiation of candidates. Note that this is a situation in which social requests for
the establishment of direct democracies would make sense as a consequence of the threat
posed by the existence of politicians exclusively moved by private interests contrary to
the interests of the majority of the electorate. On the one hand, having no candidate
with xmaj(PN) as top may be due to the increased activity of lobbies and special-interest
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groups, which prevent the existence of a candidate with the preferences of the median
voter. For its part, the fact of not having maximally top-differentiated candidates could
lead to a failure of the electoral competition. Electoral competition between traditional
left-wing and right-wing political parties comes to motivate the convergence towards the
preferences of the median voter. It is, therefore, a way to discipline self-seeking politicians
to end up acting in the best interests of the majority. However, the current disappearance
of the traditional distinction between left and right ideologies creates distrust of electoral
competition among people, thus motivating a preference for direct democracies.
Assume now that either there is a candidate with xmaj(PN) as top or candidates
are maximally top-differentiated but xmaj(PN) is not a Condorcet winner relative to the
voters’ preference profile PN . The first thing we notice is that the outcome of direct
democracy could be suffering from some of the paradoxes mentioned above since it is
not a Condorcet winner, making therefore such an outcome socially undesirable. Thus, it
seems natural to think that there would be room for a better performance of representative
democracy in this context. However, unlike the previous case, it is not possible here to
carry out an immediate comparison between the outcomes of both systems in order to
suggest the suitability of one of them. We no longer have an alternative that can be
clearly defended as desirable, as was previously the case with the Condorcet winner.
Buechel (2014) finds that, on our preferences domain, if xmaj(PN) is not a Condorcet
winner, then a Condorcet winner does not exist.8 This could be understood as a situation
in which voters are very heterogeneous on their preferences, in such a way that given
any alternative, some majority coalition among voters preferring a different alternative
can always arise. This creates some difficulties in obtaining an outcome in representative
democracy. The existence of cycles on voters’ preferences implies that a Nash Equilibrium
outcome of the electoral game may not exist. The non-existence of an alternative in
whose implementation a majority of voters agree joint with the difficulty of reaching
an agreement between two politicians with totally different ideological positions would
eventually result in an incessant existence of profitable deviations for each of them, thus
8Buechel (2014) finds that, on the domain of separable preferences, if there exists a Condorcet winner,
then it coincides with the median alternative, which in our case is given by xmaj(PN ).
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preventing the achievement of an equilibrium in the electoral competition.
2.5. Conclusion
There are more and more social movements and political parties claiming that the
true respect of the will of a society lies in carrying out, for each single issue, what the
majority desires. Given the risk of having self-seeking politicians in representative democ-
racy, these groups defend the better suitability of direct democracy when respecting the
interests of society. We have proposed a model to study when a system of representative
democracy would be equivalent to a system of direct democracy in terms of the developed
policies. We find necessary and sufficient conditions such that, decisions made on each is-
sue in representative democracies coincide with the decisions that would have been chosen
in direct democracies by majority voting issue-by-issue, regardless of whether candidates
are either policy-motivated or office-motivated. First, the majority voting issue-by-issue
output (i.e., xmaj(PN)) has to be a Condorcet winner relative to the voters’ preference
profile PN . Second, either there is a candidate with xmaj(PN) as her most preferred alter-
native or top, or candidates are maximally top-differentiated, which means that there is
no issue for which both candidates have the same more preferred decision. First condition
can be interpreted as the existence of some degree of homogeneity among voters’ prefer-
ences about the suitability of the implementation of decisions yielded by majority voting
issue-by-issue. Second condition can be understood as the existence of either at least one
candidate whose preferences are in line with preferences of society, or candidates with suf-
ficiently different preferences. The concurrent fulfillment of both conditions allows that,
on the one hand, any potentially profitable deviation from xmaj(PN) that might initially
exist for any candidate would no longer be beneficial and, on the other hand, either there
exists a candidate who trivially has no incentives to deviate from what the majority of
people desires for each issue, or there is no room for a mutually beneficial agreement for
both candidates which may violate the interests of the majority. Thus, social demands
claiming the need of removing the traditional system of political representation and estab-
lishing a direct democracy in order to respect the will of the majority is only meaningful
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in societies in which these conditions are not being met, since implementation of direct
democracy via representation would be guaranteed. Situations in which some of these
conditions does not hold deserve special attention, due to the breakdown of the equiv-
alence between the systems of direct and representative democracy. The case in which
xmaj(PN) is a Condorcet winner but neither there is a candidate with xmaj(PN) as top
nor candidates are maximally top-differentiated is especially interesting. Even when the
implementation of the majority voting issue-by-issue output is socially desirable, repre-
sentative democracy might be selecting something totally different. This event might be
due to the increased activity of lobbies and special-interest groups, which prevent the ex-
istence of a candidate with the preferences of the median voter. Similarly, a failure of the
electoral competition could be the cause. Electoral contest between traditional left-wing
and right-wing political parties used to motivate the convergence towards the preferences
of the median voter. When they disappeared, the electoral competition abandoned its
disciplining role of self-seeking politicians that forced them to behave according to the will
of the majority. Thus, direct democracy would be recommendable under this framework.
For its part, when either there is a candidate with xmaj(PN) as top or candidates are
maximally top-differentiated but xmaj(PN) is not a Condorcet winner, it is not possible
to carry out a comparison between the outcomes of direct democracy and representative
democracy in order to suggest the suitability of one of them. The non-existence of an
alternative in whose implementation a majority of citizens agree hinders the existence of
an equilibrium in the electoral competition: cycles on voters’ preferences would imply
that incessant profitable deviations for each of the candidates may exist, thus preventing
the achievement of a stable situation between the two politicians in the electoral game.
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Chapter 3
Condorcet Consistent Scoring Rules
And Single-Peakedness
This chapter has been published as:
Berga, D., G. Correa-Lopera, and B. Moreno (2019). “Condorcet Consistent Scoring Rules
And Single-Peakedness”. Economics Letters 181, 199-202. DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.028
3.1. Introduction
When only two alternatives are at stake, majority voting is the best method, the one
satisfying well-known properties (see May, 1952). The challenge is to extend majority
voting among pairs to situations where there are more than two alternatives. Condorcet
proposed choosing the alternative defeating every other alternative in pairwise compar-
isons (Condorcet, 1785). Borda proposed assigning points to each candidate according to
preferences and choosing the alternative with the highest total score (Borda, 1781). These
two proposals lead to the two most acknowledged families of voting rules, Condorcet win-
ner rules and scoring (or positional) rules (Smith, 1973; Young, 1975). The Condorcet
consistent criterion, requiring the election of the Condorcet winner when it exists, is a
widely used principle for evaluating alternative voting rules. On an unrestricted domain
of preferences, for any odd number of voters and any number of alternatives higher than
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two, each scoring rule is not Condorcet consistent for some preference profile (Fishburn,
1973). In this paper we consider the set of single-peaked preferences and we are interested
in analyzing which scoring rules, if any, are Condorcet consistent.
Finding out what is the “optimal” size of a group of voters has been paid attention
in the literature. In the context of the Condorcet’s jury theorem, where a group of voters
wants to reach the “correct” decision by majority voting, the number of voters that should
be included in the group depends on the probability of voting for the correct decision of
each voter (Condorcet, 1875; Grofman, Owen, and Feld, 1983).
While Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 presents the main results and their
proofs. Other results are placed in the Appendix.
3.2. The Model
Let A = {a1, a2, ..., am} be a finite set ofm ≥ 3 alternatives where a1 < a2 < ... < am,
and N = {1, ..., n} be an odd finite set of n ≥ 3 agents. Each agent i’s preferences are
linear orders over alternatives, denoted by Ri, which are single-peaked on A. For any al,
ak ∈ A, alRiak denotes that al is strictly preferred to ak by i at Ri. A preference R is
single-peaked on A if (i) there exists an alternative p(R), the peak of R, such that p(R)Ral
for any al ∈ A, and (ii) for every pair of alternatives al, ak ∈ A such that p (R) < al < ak
or ak < al < p (R), alRak. Let S denote the set of all single-peaked preferences on A.
Elements in Sn are called preference profiles, and are denoted by RN = (R1, ..., Rn). A
voting rule r : Sn → 2A\∅ selects a non-empty set of alternatives for each preference
profile. We define two types of voting rules: the Condorcet winner rule and the scoring
rules.
We say that an alternative aj defeats alternative ak in majority comparison if a strict
majority of agents prefers aj over ak. When n is odd and preferences are single-peaked,
there always exists a unique alternative that defeats any other by majority comparisons,
which is called the Condorcet winner. The Condorcet winner rule CW assigns to each
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preference profile the Condorcet winner, that is, the unique alternative that defeats every
other alternative in pairwise majority comparisons.
Fix a vector w = (w0, ..., wm−1) ∈ Rm satisfying w0 ≤ w1 ≤ ... ≤ wm−2 ≤ wm−1 and
w0 < wm−1. Without loss of generality, we assume that w0 = 0 and wm−1 = 1. Points are
assigned to every alternative in such a way that if alternative x is in the j’th top position
according to Ri, then x receives sw(x,Ri) = wm−j points from agent i. Given a preference
profile RN and an alternative x, let sw(x,RN) =
∑n
i=1 sw(x,Ri) be the score assigned to
x at RN . The w-scoring rule Sw assigns to each preference profile the set of alternatives
with the highest score.1
Given A and N , we say that a w-scoring rule is Condorcet consistent if for any
RN ∈ Sn, CW (RN) ∈ Sw(RN).
For each m, call semiplurality rules the family of w-scoring rules where wm−2 = w1 ∈[
0, 12
]
. Note that plurality is a member of this family for w1 = 0. The Borda count for m
alternatives is the w-scoring rule where |wl − wl+1| = |wl+1 − wl+2| for all l = 0, ...,m− 2.
The Borda count is a semiplurality rule only for m = 3 and w1 = 12 .
3.3. Results and Discussion
For each size of the society and the set of alternatives, we characterize the subset of
w-scoring rules that are Condorcet consistent. We focus on the cases of three or more
alternatives because in the case of two alternatives each w-scoring rule trivially chooses
the Condorcet winner. We obtain positive results for specific situations, but only with
three or five agents. The characterization is obtained in Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
1Our definition of scoring rules is from Moulin (1988). See Young (1975) and also Bossert and Suzu-
mura (2018) for the equivalent definition of positional scoring rules.
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Proposition 1. Let n = 3. (i) For m 6= 4, a w-scoring rule is Condorcet consistent if
and only if wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
and wm−2 = w1. (ii) For m = 4, a w-scoring rule is Condorcet
consistent if and only if wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
.
For m 6= 4, this is the family of semiplurality scoring rules with wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
.
Proposition 2. Let n = 5. (i) For m = 3, a w-scoring rule is Condorcet consistent if
and only if wm−2 = 13 . (ii) For m ≥ 4, no w-scoring rule is Condorcet consistent.
Proposition 3. For n > 5 and any m ≥ 3, no w-scoring rule is Condorcet consistent.
To prove the "only if" implication (⇒) of Propositions 1 and 2 it is useful to state the
following two Lemmas, proved in the Appendix, that present the scoring rules violating
Condorcet consistency for three and five agents.
Lemma 1. Let n = 3. (a) For any m ≥ 3, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
is
Condorcet consistent. (b) For any m ≥ 5, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
and
wm−3 > w1, or with wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
and wm−2 > wm−3 = w1 is Condorcet consistent.
Lemma 2. Let n = 5. (a) For m = 3, no w-scoring rule such that wm−2 ∈
[
0, 13
)
∪
(
1
3 , 1
]
is Condorcet consistent. (b) For m ≥ 4, no w-scoring rule is Condorcet consistent.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of the "only if" implication (⇒) of both Parts (i)
and (ii) is straightforward by Parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 1. It remains to prove the "if"
implication of both Parts (i) and (ii). We provide a proof for Part (ii).
(ii) Let n = 3 and m = 4. The w-scoring rule such that wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
is Condorcet
consistent. We distinguish the following four cases:
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Case 1: RN ∈ Sn such that p(R1) = p(R2) = p(R3) = p. Clearly CW (RN) = {p} =
Sw(RN).
Case 2: RN ∈ Sn such that p(R1) = p(R2) = at < p(R3) = at+l for some t ∈ {1, ...,m −
1} and l 6 m − t. Note that CW (RN) = at. Also, observe on the one hand that
sw(at, RN) ≥ 2 ≥ 1+2wm−2 since wm−2 ≤ 12 . On the other hand, sw(at+l, RN) ≤ 1+2wm−2
holds. Moreover, for all x /∈ {at, at+l}, sw(x,RN) ≤ 3wm−2 ≤ 32 since wm−2 ≤ 12 .Thus,
sw(x,RN) ≤ 32 < 2 ≤ sw(at, RN). Thus, CW (RN) = at ∈ Sw(RN).
Case 3: RN ∈ Sn such that p(R1) = at < p(R2) = p(R3) = at+l for some t ∈ {1, ...,m−1}
and l 6 m− t. This case is symmetric to Case 2 exchanging the roles of at and at+l.
Case 4: RN ∈ Sn such that p(R1) < p(R2) < p(R3). Note first that CW (RN) = p(R2).
When computing we obtain that sw(p(R1), RN) ≤ 1 + wm−2 + w1, sw(p(R3), RN) ≤
1 + wm−2 + w1, and 1 + wm−2 + w1 ≤ sw(p(R2), RN) ≤ 1 + 2wm−2. Furthermore, for any
alternative x < p(R1), sw(x,RN) ≤ sw(p(R1), RN) and for any alternative y > p(R3),
sw(y,RN) ≤ sw(p(R3), RN). Thus, CW (RN) = p(R2) ∈ Sw(RN).
Wrapping up, Sw is Condorcet consistent. This shows Part (ii) that can be replicated for
Part (i). Thus, the proof ends. 
To prove Proposition 2, we need some notation. Form = 3, there are only four single-
peaked preferences, say R, R′, R′′, and R′′′ defined as follows: a1Ra2Ra3, a2R′a3R′a1,
a2R
′′a1R′′a3, and a3R′′′a2R′′′a1. For any RN ∈ Sn, let n1 be the number of agents with
preferences R, n2 the number of agents with preferences R′, n3 the number of agents with
preferences R′′, and n4 ≡ n − (n1 + n2 + n3) the number of agents with preferences R′′′.
Note that the triple (n1,n2,n3) uniquely defines a profile.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 is proved since it coincides with Part
(b) of Lemma 2. To prove Part (i) of Proposition 2, observe that Part (a) of Lemma 2
shows the "only if" implication (⇒) of Part (i). It only remains to prove the "if" implica-
tion of Part (i): We have to show that for n = 5 and m = 3, the w-scoring rule such that
wm−2 = 13 is Condorcet consistent.
Let RN ∈ Sn and (n1, n2, n3) be the triple uniquely associated to RN . Since wm−2 = 13 ,
57
then sw(a1, RN) = n1 + 13n3, sw(a2, RN) =
2
3 (n2 + n3) +
5
3 , and sw(a3, RN) = n4 +
1
3n2.
Consider five cases.
Case 1: n1 = 5. Observe that CW (RN) = a1, and sw(a1, RN) = 5 > sw(a2, RN) = 53 >
sw(a3, RN) = 0 which shows Condorcet consistency.
Case 2: n1 = 4. Observe that CW (RN) = a1, sw(a1, RN) ≥ 4, sw(a3, RN) ≤ 1, and
sw(a2, RN) ≤ 73 , which shows Condorcet consistency.
Case 3: n1 = 3. Observe that CW (RN) = a1 and that sw(a1, RN) = 3 + 13n3 >
sw(a3, RN) = (2−n2−n3)+ 13n2 = 2−n3− 23n2. To get Condorcet consistency, it remains
to show that sw(a1, RN) ≥ sw(a2, RN). Since n = 5 and n1 = 3, then 0 ≤ n2 + n3 ≤ 2,
and for any possible such tuple (n2, n3), we can check that 3 + 13n3 ≥ 23(n2 +n3) + 53 . This
ends the proof of Case 3.
Case 4: n1 = 2. Note that CW (RN) 6= a1. Moreover, CW (RN) = a3 if and only if n4 = 3.
The Condorcet consistency of this subcase is proved by symmetry to Case 3 exchanging
the roles of n1 and a1 by n4 and a3, respectively.
Note that CW (RN) = a2 if and only if n4 ≤ 2, equivalently, 1 ≤ n2 + n3 ≤ 3.
Subcase 4.1 : n4 = 0, or equivalently, n2 + n3 = 3. Note that sw(a3, RN) = 13n2 ≤ 1.
Moreover, 1 < 2 + 13n3 = sw(a1, RN) and since n3 ≤ 3, 2 + 13n3 < sw(a2, RN) = 2 + 53 .
Thus, we get Condorcet consistency.
Subcase 4.2 : n4 = 1, or equivalently, n2 + n3 = 2. Since n2 ≤ 2, note first that
sw(a3, RN) = 1 + 13n2 < 1 +
2
3 ≤ sw(a1, RN) = 2 + 13n3. Moreover, since n3 ≤ 2,
sw(a1, RN) = 2 + 13n3 ≤ 2 + 132 < 3 = 232 + 53 = sw(a2, RN). Thus, we get Condorcet
consistency.
Subcase 4.3 : n4 = 2, or equivalently, n2 + n3 = 1. Since n3 ≤ 1, sw(a1, RN) = 2 + 13n3 ≤
7
3 = sw(a2, RN). Similarly, since n2 ≤ 1, sw(a3, RN) = 2 + 13n2 ≤ 73 = sw(a2, RN). Thus,
we get Condorcet consistency.
Case 5: n1 = 1. Note first that CW (RN) 6= a1. Moreover, by definition of CW the
following two statements hold: (1) CW (RN) = a3 if and only if n4 ∈ {3, 4} and (2)
CW (RN) = a2 if and only if n4 ≤ 2. We first show Condorcet consistency for situa-
tion in (1). Since n4 ∈ {3, 4}, or equivalently 0 ≤ n2 + n3 ≤ 1, sw(a3, RN) = n4 + 13n2
≥ 3 > 73 ≥ sw(a2, RN) = 23(n2 + n3) + 53 and also sw(a3, RN) = n4 + 13n2 ≥ 3 > 43
≥ sw(a1, RN) = 1 + 13n3. To show Condorcet consistency for situation in (2), that is,
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when CW (RN) = a2, note that n4 ≤ 2 if and only if 2 ≤ n2 + n3 ≤ 4. Observe that
sw(a1, RN) = n1 + 13n3 = 1 +
1
3n3 is always smaller than sw(a2, RN) =
2
3(n2 + n3) +
5
3 .
Note that since n4 ≤ 2, sw(a3, RN) = n4 + 13n2 ≤ 2 + 13n2 which is smaller or equal than
3 when n2 ≤ 3. Since 2 ≤ n2 + n3, sw(a3, RN) ≤ 3 ≤ sw(a2, RN) = 23(n2 + n3) + 53 .
For the case where n2 > 3, that is, n2 = 4, we have that n3 = n4 = 0. Clearly,
sw(a3, RN) = n4 + 13n2 =
4
3 < sw(a2, RN) =
2
3(n2 + n3) +
5
3 =
13
3 . Thus, we prove Con-
dorcet consistency.
Case 6: n1 = 0. Note first that CW (RN) 6= a1 and observe that sw(a1, RN) = 13n3 is al-
ways smaller than sw(a2, RN) = 23(n2+n3)+
5
3 . Moreover, on the one hand, CW (RN) = a2
if and only if n2 + n3 > n4 and CW (RN) = a3 if and only if n2 + n3 < n4, since being n
odd and n1 = 0, n2 +n3 6= n4. On the other hand, the scoring single winner is a2, that is,
sw(a2, RN) = 23(n2 + n3) +
5
3 > sw(a3, RN) = 5− n3 − 23n2 if and only if 4n2 + 5n3 > 10,
which holds if and only if n2 +n3 > n4. To check the first "if and only if" implication note
that 23(n2 + n3) +
5
3 > 5− n3 − 23n2 if and only if 43n2 + 53n3 − 103 > 0, which holds if and
only if 4n2 + 5n3 > 10. The latter "if and only if" implication is proved by checking that
for each triple n2, n3 and n4 with n2 + n3 > n4 for the smallest value of n2 + n3 (that is,
3), the inequality 4n2 + 5n3 > 10 holds. Observe that if the latter inequality holds for the
smallest value of n2 + n3, it will also hold for all possible cases. Then, we also have that
CW (RN) = a3 if and only if n2 + n3 < n4. We get Condorcet consistency which ends the
proof. 
Proposition 3 states an impossibility result to obtain Condorcet consistent w-scoring
rules for seven or more agents. Its proof is in the Appendix.
Summarizing, in this paper, we show that if the size of the group of voters is three,
a sub-family of the scoring rules is Condorcet consistent for any number of alternatives.
We also show that when there are three alternatives at stake, if the size of the group of
voters is between three and five, then some scoring rules are Condorcet consistent.
Lepelley (1996) considers also single-peaked preferences but concentrates on different
Condorcet criteria. Moreno and Puy (2005) analyze Condorcet consistency of scoring
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rules but in a setting where the agenda is not fixed. Bossert and Suzumura (2019) pro-
pose a generalization of positional voting rules allowing for non-additive criteria to be
included. Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko (2019) characterize a class of multi-winner
scoring rules satisfying axioms in the spirit of Young’s characterization for single-winner
scoring methods. In the context of experimental economics, Slater (1958) proposes to
estimate the “optimal” group size as the size preferred by group members. The author
considers groups of two to seven individuals from a single population who meet several
times to discuss about some human relations problem and submit a group solution to
it. Slater finds that five-person groups are optimal. Hackman and Vidmar (1970) extend
Slater’s analysis to the case in which groups members are drawn from two different pop-
ulations and where three types of intellectual tasks to be carried out by those groups are
distinguished. In line with Slater’s conclusion, they find that agents in the experiment
consider a group size between four and five members as optimal.
3.4. Appendix
We prove Proposition 3 and Lemmas 1 and 2 used for the proof of Propositions 1
and 2. We first introduce and prove six Lemmas.
Define four preferences used in the proofs of Lemmas 3 to 7: R ∈ S is such that
a1Ra2R...Ram−1Ram, R′ ∈ S is such that a2R′a3R′...R′amR′a1, R′′ ∈ S is such that
amR
′′am−1R′′...R′′a2R′′a1, and R′′′ ∈ S is such that a3R′′′a4R′′′a5R′′′...R′′′amR′′′a2R′′′a1.
To prove these lemmas, we propose preference profiles for which Condorcet consistency
fails.
Lemma 3. For any n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 3, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
is Condorcet
consistent.
Proof. Let RN ∈ Sn where # {i ∈ N : Ri = R} = n+12 and # {i ∈ N : Ri = R′} =
n−1
2 . Note that CW (RN) = a1 and x /∈ Sw(RN) for x ∈ A\{a1, a2} since sw(a2, RN) >
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sw(x,RN). Moreover, sw(a2, RN) = n−12 +
n+1
2 wm−2 >
n−1
2 +
n+1
4 and
n+1
2 +
n−3
4 ≥ n+12 =
sw(a1, RN) since n ≥ 3. Thus, Sw(RN) = {a2}. 
Lemma 4. For any n ≥ 5 and m ≥ 4, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 < 1 is Condorcet
consistent.
Proof. Let RN ∈ Sn where # {i ∈ N : Ri = R} = n−12 , # {i ∈ N : Ri = R′} = 1, and
# {i ∈ N : Ri = R′′′} = n−12 . Note that CW (RN) = a2, sw(a2, RN) = n−12 wm−2 + 1 +
n−1
2 w1, and sw(a3, RN) =
n−1
2 +wm−2 +
n−1
2 wm−3. Since
n−1
2 = 1 +
n−3
2 and wm−2 < 1, we
obtain that sw(a3, RN) > n−12 wm−2 + 1 +
n−1
2 wm−3. Moreover,
n−1
2 wm−2 + 1 +
n−1
2 wm−3 ≥
sw(a2, RN) since wm−3 ≥ w1. Thus, a2 = CW (RN) /∈ Sw(RN). 
Lemma 5. For any n > 5 and m = 3, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
is Condorcet
consistent.
Proof. Distinguish three cases: (1) wm−2 < n−32(n−2) , (2) wm−2 >
n−3
2(n−2) , and (3) wm−2 =
n−3
2(n−2) .
Case 1: let RN ∈ Sn such that # {i ∈ N : Ri = R} = n−12 , # {i ∈ N : Ri = R′} = 1, and
# {i ∈ N : Ri = R′′} = n−12 . Note that CW (RN) = a2. We can check that sw(a2, RN) =
(n−1)wm−2 +1, sw(a3, RN) = wm−2 + n−12 , and thus, sw(a3, RN) > sw(a2, RN) if and only
if wm−2 < n−32(n−2) .
Case 2: let RN ∈ Sn such that # {i ∈ N : Ri = R} = n+12 , # {i ∈ N : Ri = R′} = 2, and
# {i ∈ N : Ri = R′′} = n−52 . Note that CW (RN) = a1. We can check that sw(a2, RN) =
(n − 2)wm−2 + 2, sw(a1, RN) = n+12 , and thus, sw(a2, RN) > sw(a1, RN) if and only if
wm−2 > n−32(n−2) .
Case 3: let RN ∈ Sn such that # {i ∈ N : Ri = R} = n+12 , # {i ∈ N : Ri = R′} = 3, and
# {i ∈ N : Ri = R′′} = n−72 . Note that the profiles is well-defined since n > 5. Note that
CW (RN) = a1. We can check that sw(a2, RN) = (n− 3)wm−2 + 3, sw(a1, RN) = n+12 , and
thus, sw(a3, RN) > sw(a1, RN) if and only if wm−2 > n−52(n−3) , which holds for all n > 1,
since wm−2 = n−32(n−2) . 
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Lemma 6. For any n = 5 and m = 3, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
[
0, 13
)
∪
(
1
3 ,
1
2
]
is
Condorcet consistent.
The profiles of preferences in Cases (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 5 work to
prove Lemma 6.
Lemma 7. For any n = 3 and m ≥ 5, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
(
0, 12
]
and
wm−3 > w1 is Condorcet consistent.
Proof. Let RN ∈ Sn such that # {i ∈ N : Ri = R} = 1, # {i ∈ N : Ri = R′} = 1, and
# {i ∈ N : Ri = R′′} = 1. Note that CW (RN) = a2. We can check that x /∈ Sw(RN) for
x ∈ A\{a1, a2, a3} since sw(a2, RN) > sw(x,RN). Moreover, since sw(a2, RN) = 1+wm−2+
w1 < sw(a3, RN) = 1+wm−2+wm−3 by wm−3 > w1, we get that CW (RN) = a2 /∈ Sw(RN).

Lemma 8. For any n = 3 and m ≥ 5, no w-scoring rule with wm−2 ∈
[
0, 12
]
and
wm−2 > wm−3 = w1 is Condorcet consistent.
Proof. Take any RN ∈ S3 such that the preferences of the three agents are R˜, R, and
R̂ ∈ S, where a2R˜a1R˜a3R˜...R˜am−1R˜am, a3Ra2Ra4Ra1Ra5R...Ram, and a4R̂a5R̂a3R̂a2
R̂a1R̂...R̂am. Note that CW (RN) = a3. We can check that x /∈ Sw(RN) for x ∈
A\{a2, a3, a4} since sw(a2, RN) = 1 + wm−2 + w1 > wm−2 + 2w1 ≥ sw(x,RN). More-
over, sw(a2, RN) = 1 +wm−2 +w1 > sw(a3, RN) = sw(a4, RN) = 1 + 2w1 since wm−2 > w1.
Then, we get that CW (RN) = a3 /∈ Sw(RN) = {a2}. 
The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward by Lemmas 3, 7, and 8.
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward by Lemmas 3, 4, and 6.
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward by Lemmas 3, 4, and 5.
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General Conclusions
In this PhD dissertation we have focused on the study of two of the most widespread
forms of government around the world: direct democracy and representative democracy.
The recent success of direct democracy systems among the population to the detriment of
the popularity of the traditional systems of political representation has led us to address
this issue. From a theoretical perspective, we have answered a series of questions that
explain why societies may have a preference for one or another system of government,
as well as describe those situations in which the employment of one or another system
(and the way in which it is applied) becomes a really relevant concern due to the social
consequences that this could entail.
In Chapter 1 we have proposed a model to investigate under which conditions voters
prefer either a system of direct democracy or a system of representative democracy. We
find that the preference of a society to be governed by either one or the other system
depends on both the type of the electorate and the type of the median voter. As long
as the electorate is pragmatic, representative democracy is the preferred system. The
informational advantage of representatives is enough for an electorate concerned about
the implementation of the economically efficient policy to have incentives to delegate.
When the electorate is ideological, though, we have to look at the type of the median
voter in order to determine the preferred system. If the electorate is ideological and
the median voter is pragmatic, then representative democracy is the preferred system.
This situation is what we have identified as a polarized electorate: no ideological group
constitutes a majority by itself and a clear division of the electorate into two groups
defending opposing policies exists. Trying to avoid that something opposed to their own
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ideological bias is chosen, the group of ideological voters biased towards the policy that
would not be chosen in direct democracy prefers to delegate their vote to representatives.
These ideological voters, along with the existing pragmatic voters in the society, constitute
a majority coalition in favour of the representative democracy. Moreover, the demand of
direct democracy is increasing in the polarization of the electorate, as long as no ideological
group becomes a majority. On the contrary, when an ideological group becomes a majority,
and therefore both electorate and median voter are ideological, direct democracy is the
preferred system. Such an electorate prefers a system that guarantees the implementation
of the policy on which the majority agree, rather than running the risk of allowing a
representative to choose. This situation is what we have associated with societies in
which populist movements have been successful. In this way, our model predicts that an
increase in populism will increase the demand for direct democracy.
In Chapter 2 we have proposed a model to study when a system of representative
democracy would be equivalent to a system of direct democracy in terms of the developed
policies. We find necessary and sufficient conditions such that, decisions made on each is-
sue in representative democracies coincide with the decisions that would have been chosen
in direct democracies by majority voting issue-by-issue, regardless of whether candidates
are either policy-motivated or office-motivated. First, the majority voting issue-by-issue
output has to be a Condorcet winner relative to the voters’ preference profile. Second,
either there is a candidate with such an output as her most preferred alternative or top,
or candidates are maximally top-differentiated, which means that there is no issue for
which both candidates have the same more preferred decision. First condition can be in-
terpreted as the existence of some degree of homogeneity among voters’ preferences about
the suitability of the implementation of decisions yielded by majority voting issue-by-issue.
Second condition can be understood as the existence of either at least one candidate whose
preferences are in line with preferences of society, or candidates with sufficiently different
preferences. The concurrent fulfillment of both conditions allows that, on the one hand,
any potentially profitable deviation from the majority voting issue-by-issue output that
might initially exist for any candidate would no longer be beneficial and, on the other
hand, either there exists a candidate who trivially has no incentives to deviate from what
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the majority of people desires for each issue, or there is no room for a mutually beneficial
agreement for both candidates which may violate the interests of the majority. Thus,
social demands claiming the need of removing the traditional system of political repre-
sentation and establishing a direct democracy in order to respect the will of the majority
is only meaningful in societies in which these conditions are not being met.
In Chapter 3 we have proposed a solution that seeks to reconcile both sides of support-
ers of direct democracy and representative democracy, offering a response to the concerns
raised to each of them when the system contrary to their liking is adopted. Supporters of
representative democracy question the suitability of direct democracy to achieve the rep-
resentativeness of the majority’s preferences due to the risk involved by the low turnout
when a referendum is held. If not enough people vote to make the decision relevant, it
will be biased, not representing therefore the preferences of the majority. For their part,
supporters of direct democracy criticize representative democracy as a result of the pos-
sible non-representativeness of the will of the majority due to the risk of decisions being
made by self-seeking politicians. They go even further by claiming that the damage suf-
fered by society when decisions are made by self-seeking politicians could be even larger
if the intensity of voters’ preferences is taken into account. The proposed solution is to
have decisions made by a committee through scoring rules that are Condorcet consistent.
The composition of such committee perfectly represents the distribution of voters’ prefer-
ences over the set of alternatives. Committee members cannot abstain, removing thus the
risk of underrepresentation warned by supporters of representative democracy, and they
sincerely vote according to their preferences, being thus the outcome of the voting fully
representative of the preferences of the electorate, which meets the demands of supporters
of direct democracy. We find that if the size of the committee is three, a sub-family of the
scoring rules is Condorcet consistent for any number of alternatives. We also find that
when there are three alternatives at stake, if the size of the committee is between three
and five, then some scoring rules are Condorcet consistent.
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Summary In Spanish - Resumen En
Español
Durante siglos, la idoneidad de la democracia representativa como sistema de gob-
ierno no ha sido cuestionada en absoluto. Si bien han sido dos las teorías de la repre-
sentación que han sido tradicionalmente distinguidas, esto es, la teoría de la semejanza
y la teoría de la sustitución, es esta última la que ha sido empleada para defender la
mejor habilidad de los políticos frente a los ciudadanos a la hora de tomar decisiones.
La teoría de la representación como semejanza remonta sus orígenes a la obra Crátilo, el
diálogo escrito por Platón en el año 360 a.C. Según esta teoría, un representante debería
semejarse a lo que representa. Así, se hace necesaria la existencia de una similitud entre
políticos y ciudadanos para poder hablar de representación de los segundos por parte de
los primeros. En cuanto a la teoría de la representación como sustitución, fue propuesta
por primera vez por Edmund Burke en su obra Indagación filosófica sobre el origen de
nuestras ideas acerca de lo sublime y de lo bello, publicada en 1757. De acuerdo a esta
teoría, la representación ha de entenderse como un hacer presente (de nuevo) lo que está
(ahora) ausente. Dicho de otro modo, se trata de un sustituto o reemplazo de algo que
está ausente. Resulta llamativo que, a diferencia del caso anterior, esta teoría no menciona
ningún criterio (semejanza o algo similar) que deba ser satisfecho para que un político
pudiera ser el representante de los ciudadanos. Implícitamente, se permite que existan
diferencias de diversa naturaleza entre representantes y representados. Beneficiándose de
esta posibilidad, muchos autores, tanto en el ámbito de la Economía como en el de las
Ciencias Políticas, se han fundamentado en el supuesto de que los políticos disponen de
mejor información que los ciudadanos ordinarios acerca de lo que debe hacerse en cada
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momento para defender los sistemas de representación política. Otra ventaja de la democ-
racia representativa manifestada en la literatura es la reducción del riesgo de la llamada
“tiranía de la mayoría”, reconocida por autores tales como Alexis de Tocqueville y John
Stuart Mill, según la cual una mayoría democrática impondría su voluntad sobre una
minoría. Advirtiendo de los peligros de la democracia directa, James Madison escribía en
su obra Federalista 10 publicada en 1787: “Resulta de gran importancia... para proteger
a una parte de la sociedad frente a la injusticia de la otra parte. Intereses diferenciados
necesariamente existen en diferentes clases de ciudadanos. Si una mayoría está unida por
un interés común, los derechos de la minoría estarán en peligro.”
La vida ha sido fácil para la democracia representativa. Hasta ahora. El libro Refer-
endums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, editado por David Butler y Austin
Ranney y publicado en 1978 por el Instituto Norteamericano de la Empresa (American
Enterprise Institute - AEI) es considerado uno de los primeros intentos por recoger la
experiencia mundial con el instrumento del referéndum. Dicha obra trata de justificar la
creciente insatisfacción del electorado con la actuación de los representantes electos me-
diante el uso, cada vez mayor, de referéndums en varias naciones de todo el mundo. Los
editores se basan en estudios de referéndums celebrados en Australia, Francia, Irlanda,
Suiza, países escandinavos y Estados Unidos, entre otros. Algunos años más tarde y fruto
de este trabajo, Ranney publicó su obra The Referendum Device, cuya reseña fue incluida
en la revista American Political Science Review, una de las que cuentan con un mayor
índice de impacto dentro de la categoría de Ciencias Políticas. Este texto analiza nueva-
mente el deseo de referéndums en los regímenes democráticos. Referendums Around the
World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (1994) y Referendums Around the World:
The Continued Growth of Direct Democracy (2014) constituyen posteriores reediciones de
la obra de Butler y Ranney. Tales textos continúan contribuyendo a explicar cómo los
referéndums estaban afectando a la forma de hacer política en aquellos países entre los
que dicho instrumento estaba más extendido.
El descontento de los ciudadanos con el sistema de representación política ha venido
creciendo cada vez más en los últimos años. Dicho aumento ha provocado que, reciente-
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mente, algunos sectores de la sociedad hayan dejado de ver la democracia directa como
un mero complemento de la democracia representativa y, en su lugar, hayan comenzado
a considerarla como un potencial sustituto. De hecho, venimos presenciando una ten-
dencia creciente en los niveles de popularidad de los sistemas de gobierno en los que los
ciudadanos pueden decidir directamente sin necesidad de la tradicional intermediación de
los políticos. El principal objetivo de esta Tesis Doctoral es abordar el estudio de este
fenómeno comparando los sistemas de democracia directa y democracia representativa
desde un punto de vista teórico. Ante el innegable éxito y aceptación popular de los
instrumentos de democracia directa tales como los referéndums y las consultas populares
a la hora de tomar decisiones, una primera pregunta muy natural es cuándo los votantes
prefieren un sistema de democracia directa o un sistema de democracia representativa.
En el Capítulo 1 proponemos un modelo para investigar bajo qué condiciones los votantes
prefieren uno u otro sistema. En las democracias directas los votantes eligen una política
de entre dos alternativas, bajo incertidumbre acerca de qué política se ajusta mejor a la
realización del estado del mundo; en las democracias representativas los votantes eligen
a un candidato quien, una vez elegido, selecciona una política tras haber observado el
estado del mundo realizado. Los pagos de los votantes y de los políticos dependen de un
componente común que es positivo sólo si la política se ajusta al estado del mundo, y de
un sesgo ideológico privado hacia una de las políticas. En las democracias directas los
votantes tienen incertidumbre acerca del estado del mundo futuro, mientras que en las
democracias representativas tienen incertidumbre acerca del grado del sesgo ideológico
de los candidatos, aun cuando la política hacia la cual cada candidato está sesgado es
conocida. Nosotros demostramos que la democracia representativa es preferida si (i) la
mayoría de votantes son pragmáticos (prevalece el componente común), y (ii) la sociedad
está ideológicamente polarizada, lo que significa que la mayoría de votantes son ideológicos
(prevalece el componente privado), pero el votante mediano es pragmático. La democracia
directa es el instrumento preferido para la toma colectiva de decisiones en sociedades en
las que la mayoría de votantes y el votante mediano son ideológicos, lo que implica que la
mayoría de votantes tienen el mismo sesgo ideológico, como sucede, por ejemplo, cuando
la retórica populista de la gente contra la élite tiene éxito. Además, descubrimos que la
demanda de democracia directa es creciente en la polarización del electorado, siempre y
68
cuando ningún grupo ideológico de votantes llegue a ser una mayoría.
Como cabría esperar, el mencionado éxito de la democracia directa viene resultando
desde hace algún tiempo en la emergencia de movimientos sociales y partidos políticos
que exigen la participación directa de los ciudadanos en el proceso de toma de decisiones,
lo cual permitiría a la gente decidir sobre todos y cada uno de los temas que se planteasen
a debate. Estos grupos no sólo defienden firmemente el sistema de democracia directa si
no que también muestran una fuerte oposición hacia el sistema de democracia represen-
tativa. Su principal crítica es la posibilidad de que los políticos sean egoístas y acaben
comportándose en contra de los intereses de la gente. En este sentido, destacan la inca-
pacidad de la democracia representativa para implementar lo que la mayoría de la gente
desea para cada tema en concreto. Si bien la idoneidad de dicho resultado podría ser
discutido, nosotros no entraremos en ese debate. En su lugar, adoptamos un enfoque más
positivo del asunto. Nos preguntamos si, de hecho, no hay espacio para que la democracia
representativa satisfaga las aspiraciones de estos grupos, siendo totalmente necesario para
tal objetivo abandonar el tradicional sistema de representación política y reemplazarlo
por un sistema de democracia directa. En el Capítulo 2 estudiamos bajo qué condiciones
los dos procedimientos de toma de decisiones mencionados serían equivalentes en términos
de las políticas llevadas a cabo para cada uno de los temas considerados. Proponemos
un modelo en el que hay un número finito de temas sobre los que debe tomarse una
decisión binaria. En las democracias directas los votantes votan directamente por su de-
cisión más preferida para cada tema, de manera que la votación por mayoría tema a tema
es el resultado obtenido en estos sistemas. En las democracias representativas, nosotros
presentamos una competición bipartidista donde las plataformas políticas de ambos par-
tidos son conocidas. Los candidatos que representan cada uno de estos partidos tendrán
tales plataformas políticas como su conjunto de decisiones para el agregado de temas más
preferido. Sin embargo, las preferencias de los candidatos de los partidos no son cono-
cidas, pudiendo éstas variar desde la motivación por la política hasta la motivación por
la oficina. Este supuesto captura la esencia de la crítica arrojada hacia los sistemas de
representación política relativa al riesgo de tener políticos que únicamente persiguen sus
propios intereses. Nosotros encontramos condiciones necesarias y suficientes tales que,
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independientemente de las preferencias de los candidatos, las decisiones tomadas para
cada tema en las democracias representativas coinciden con las decisiones que habrían
sido elegidas en las democracias directas mediante votación por mayoría tema a tema.
Estas condiciones suponen restricciones sobre pares de perfil de preferencias de votantes y
plataformas políticas de los candidatos. Si bien en el Capítulo 2 las formularemos formal-
mente, aquí ofrecemos una intuición de tales condiciones. En primer lugar, debe existir un
cierto grado de homogeneidad entre las preferencias de los votantes acerca de la idoneidad
de la implementación de las decisiones derivadas de la votación por mayoría en cada tema
tal que este conjunto de decisiones no sea derrotado en comparaciones a pares por ningún
otro conjunto de decisiones para el agregado de temas. Esto permitiría que, cualquier
desviación potencialmente beneficiosa que pudiese existir inicialmente para alguno de los
candidatos dejase de ser beneficiosa. En segundo lugar, o bien debe haber al menos un
candidato cuyas preferencias estén alineadas con las decisiones tomadas mediante votación
por mayoría en cada tema, o bien los candidatos deben tener preferencias lo suficiente-
mente diferentes.2 Esta doble condición posibilitaría, respectivamente, o bien la existencia
de un candidato que trivialmente no tendrá incentivos a desviarse de lo que la mayoría
de gente desea para cada tema, o la no existencia de lugar para un acuerdo mutuamente
beneficioso para ambos candidatos que pudiese violar los intereses de la mayoría.
Criticar el sistema contrario argumentando la posible no representatividad de las
preferencias de la mayoría en su resultado no es algo exclusivo de aquellos en favor de
la democracia directa.3 Los partidarios de la democracia representativa cuestionan a los
partidarios de la democracia directa cuando estos últimos aseguran que la democracia di-
recta es el sistema apropiado para lograr dicho objetivo de representatividad. Los primeros
destacan el riesgo que supone la baja participación cuando se celebra un referéndum. Po-
dría suceder que algunas personas decidiesen no pronunciarse acerca de un determinado
tema simplemente porque no están interesados en él. La participación se convertiría por
2Por supuesto, ambas condiciones son compatibles y podrían cumplirse al mismo tiempo.
3Como se mencionó anteriormente, los partidarios de la democracia directa critican la democracia
representativa a consecuencia de la posible no representatividad de la voluntad de la mayoría debido al
riesgo que supone que las decisiones hayan sido tomadas por políticos egoístas.
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tanto en un problema: dado que no votaron las suficientes personas como para hacer la
decisión relevante, esta estará sesgada, no representando por tanto las preferencias de la
mayoría. Es este argumento con el que ellos siguen defendiendo la figura de un represen-
tante encargado de la toma de decisiones. Sin embargo, los partidarios de la democracia
directa, lejos de rendirse, rebaten dicho argumento. Según ellos, el daño sufrido por la so-
ciedad cuando las decisiones son tomadas por políticos egoístas podría ser incluso mayor si
se tiene en cuenta la intensidad de las preferencias de los votantes: el político podría estar
eligiendo algo que, no sólo fuese en contra de las preferencias de la sociedad, si no que de
hecho fuese “realmente malo” para una mayoría de votantes. En el Capítulo 3 se propone
una solución que trata de reconciliar las visiones de ambos bandos. Nosotros evaluamos
su actuación de acuerdo a un principio ampliamente usado a la hora de evaluar reglas
de votación. Asumimos que las decisiones son tomadas por un comité mediante reglas
de puntuación. La composición de dicho comité perfectamente representa la distribución
de las preferencias de los votantes sobre el conjunto de alternativas. Los miembros del
comité no pueden abstenerse, eliminando así el riesgo de la subrrepresentación advertido
por los partidarios de la democracia representativa, y votan sinceramente de acuerdo a
sus preferencias, siendo por tanto el resultado de la votación totalmente representativo
de las preferencias del electorado, lo cual satisface las exigencias de los partidarios de
la democracia directa. Más concretamente, consideramos problemas de votación con un
número impar de miembros del comité y preferencias unimodales. Estudiamos si existen
reglas de puntuación que sean consistentes en el sentido de Condorcet, es decir, reglas de
puntuación que seleccionan, si existe, la alternativa que vence a cualquier otra alternativa
en comparaciones a pares. Con sólo tres alternativas, existen reglas de puntuación que
eligen al ganador de Condorcet únicamente con comités de tres y cinco agentes. Con
cuatro o más alternativas, sólo los comités de tres agentes funcionan. En todas estas
reglas de puntuación, a la mejor y peor alternativas se les asigna una puntuación de 1 y
0 respectivamente, y a cualquier alternativa intermedia una puntuación entre 0 y 12 . Con
cinco o más alternativas, la puntuación de cualquier alternativa intermedia debe ser la
misma, y denotaremos esta familia como las reglas de puntuación semiplurales.
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Main Results - Principales Resultados
En esta Tesis Doctoral nos hemos centrado en el estudio de dos de las formas de
gobierno más extendidas alrededor del mundo: la democracia directa y la democracia
representativa. El reciente éxito de los sistemas de democracia directa entre la población
en detrimento de la popularidad de los tradicionales sistemas de democracia representativa
nos ha llevado a abordar este tema. Desde una perspectiva teórica, hemos respondido a
una serie de cuestiones que explican porqué las sociedades podrían tener una preferencia
por uno u otro sistema de gobierno, así como describir aquellas situaciones en las que
el empleo de uno u otro sistema (y el modo en el que es aplicado) se convierte en una
preocupación realmente relevante dadas las consecuencias sociales que ello podría implicar.
En el Capítulo 1 hemos propuesto un modelo para investigar bajo qué condiciones los
votantes prefieren bien un sistema de democracia directa, o bien un sistema de democracia
representativa. Descubrimos que la preferencia de una sociedad por ser gobernada por
uno u otro sistema depende de ambos el tipo del electorado y el tipo del votante mediano.
Siempre y cuando el electorado sea pragmático, la democracia representativa es el sistema
preferido. La ventaja informativa de los representantes es suficiente como para que un
electorado preocupado por la implementación de la política económicamente eficiente
tenga incentivos a delegar. Por su parte, cuando el electorado es ideológico, debemos
fijarnos en el tipo del votante mediano para determinar cuál es el sistema preferido. Si
el electorado es ideológico y el votante mediano es pragmático, entonces la democracia
representativa es el sistema preferido. Esta situación es la que hemos identificado como
un electorado polarizado: ningún grupo ideológico constituye una mayoría por sí mismo
y existe una clara división del electorado en dos grupos defendiendo políticas opuestas.
Tratando de evitar que algo contrario a su propio sesgo ideológico sea elegido, el grupo
de votantes ideológicos sesgados hacia la política que no sería elegida en la democracia
directa prefiere delegar su voto en los representantes. Estos votantes ideológicos, junto con
los votantes pragmáticos existentes en la sociedad, constituyen una coalición mayoritaria
en favor de la democracia representativa. Además, la demanda de democracia directa
es creciente en la polarización del electorado, siempre y cuando ningún grupo ideológico
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llegue a suponer una mayoría. Por el contrario, cuando un grupo ideológico pasa a ser
una mayoría, y por tanto ambos el electorado y el votante mediano son ideológicos, la
democracia directa es el sistema preferido. Tal electorado prefiere un sistema que garantice
la implementación de la política en la cual la mayoría están de acuerdo, en lugar de correr
el riesgo de permitir a un representante que decida. Esta situación es la que hemos
asociado con las sociedades en las que los movimientos populistas han sido exitosos. De
este modo, nuestro modelo predice que un aumento del populismo aumentará la demanda
de democracia directa.
En el Capítulo 2 hemos propuesto un modelo para estudiar cuando un sistema de
democracia representativa sería equivalente a un sistema de democracia directa en térmi-
nos de las políticas desarrolladas. Encontramos condiciones necesarias y suficientes tales
que, las decisiones tomadas para cada tema en democracias representativas coincide con
las decisiones que habrían sido tomadas en democracias directas mediante votación may-
oritaria tema a tema, independientemente de si los candidatos están bien motivados por la
política o bien motivados por la oficina. En primer lugar, el resultado de la votación por
mayoría tema a tema tiene que ser un ganador de Condorcet relativo al perfil de preferencia
de los votantes. En segundo lugar, o bien hay un candidato con tal resultado como su al-
ternativa más preferida o top, o bien los candidatos están máximamente top-diferenciados,
lo cual significa que no hay ningún tema para el cual ambos candidatos tengan la misma
decisión más preferida. La primera condición puede ser interpretada como la existencia
de un cierto grado de homogeneidad entre las preferencias de los votantes acerca de la
idoneidad de la implementación de las decisiones derivadas de la votación por mayoría
en cada tema. La segunda condición puede ser entendida como la existencia de o bien al
menos un candidato cuyas preferencias estén en línea con las preferencias de la sociedad, o
bien candidatos con preferencias lo suficientemente diferentes. El cumplimiento simultá-
neo de ambas condiciones permite que, por un lado, cualquier desviación con respecto al
resultado de la votación por mayoría tema a tema potencialmente beneficiosa que pudiese
inicialmente existir para cualquiera de los candidatos dejaría de ser beneficiosa y, por otro
lado, permite que o bien exista un candidato que, trivialmente, no tendría incentivos a
desviarse de lo que la mayoría de la gente desea para cada tema, o bien que no haya sitio
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para un acuerdo mutuamente beneficioso para ambos candidatos que pudiese violar los
intereses de la mayoría. De este modo, las demandas sociales reclamando la necesidad
de eliminar el tradicional sistema de representación política y establecer una democra-
cia directa con tal de respetar la voluntad de la mayoría tienen sentido únicamente en
sociedades en las que estas condiciones no se estén cumpliendo.
En el Capítulo 3 hemos propuesto una solución que busca reconciliar a los bandos
de partidarios de la democracia directa y de la democracia representativa, ofreciendo una
respuesta a las preocupaciones surgidas a cada uno de ellos cuando el sistema contrario
al de su agrado es adoptado. Los partidarios de la democracia representativa cuestionan
la idoneidad de la democracia directa para lograr la representatividad de las preferencias
de la mayoría, debido al riesgo que supone la baja participación cuando se celebra un
referéndum. Si no vota la suficiente gente como para hacer que la decisión sea relevante,
esta estará sesgada, no representando por tanto las preferencias de la mayoría. Por su
parte, los partidarios de la democracia directa critican la democracia representativa a
causa de la posible no representatividad de la voluntad de la mayoría debido al riesgo
que supone el hecho de que las decisiones puedan ser tomadas por políticos egoístas.
Ellos van incluso más allá al afirmar que el daño sufrido por la sociedad cuando las
decisiones son tomadas por políticos egoístas podría ser incluso mayor si la intensidad de
las preferencias de los votantes fuese tenida en cuenta. La solución propuesta consiste
en que las decisiones sean tomadas por un comité mediante reglas de puntuación que
sean consistentes en el sentido de Condorcet. La composición de tal comité representa
perfectamente la distribución de las preferencias de los votantes sobre el conjunto de
alternativas. Los miembros del comité no pueden abstenerse, eliminando así el riesgo de
subrepresentación advertido por los partidarios de la democracia representativa, y votan
sinceramente de acuerdo a sus preferencias, siendo por tanto el resultado de la votación
totalmente representativo de las preferencias del electorado, lo cual satisface las demandas
de los partidarios de la democracia directa. Descubrimos que si el tamaño del comité es
tres, entonces una sub-familia de las reglas de puntuación es consistente en el sentido de
Condorcet para cualquier número de alternativas. También encontramos que cuando hay
tres alternativas en juego, si el tamaño del comité se encuentra entre tres y cinco, entonces
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hay algunas reglas de puntuación que son consistentes en el sentido de Condorcet.
75
Bibliography
1. Akkerman, A., C. Mudde, and A. Zaslove (2014). “How Populist Are the People?
Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters”. Comparative Political Studies 47 (9), 1324-
1353.
2. Amartya, S. (1970). “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”. Journal of Political
Economy 78 (1), 152-157.
3. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1976). “On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfillment of the
Majority’s Will”. Analysis 36 (4), 161-168.
4. Besley, T., and S. Coate (2008). “Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives”. Quar-
terly Journal of Political Science 3 (4), 379-397.
5. Borda, J. - C. (1781). “Mémoire sur les Élections au Scrutin”,Mémoires de l’Académie
Royale des Sciences année 1781, 657-665. Translated and reprinted in McLean and
Urken (1995, Chapter 5).
6. Bossert, W., and K. Suzumura (2018). “Positionalist Voting Rules: A General
Definition and Axiomatic Characterizations”. Mimeo.
7. Buechel, B. (2014). “Condorcet Winners on Median Spaces”. Social Choice and
Welfare 42 (3), 735-750.
8. Coffman, K. B. (2016). “Representative Democracy and the Implementation of
Majority-Preferred Alternatives”. Social Choice and Welfare 46 (3), 477-494.
9. Condorcet, M. J. A. N. (1785). “Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse à la Prob-
abilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix”, Paris: Imprimerie Royale.
76
Translated and reprinted in part in McLean and Urken (1995, Chapter 6).
10. Cukierman, A., and M. Tommasi (1998). “When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to
China?”. American Economic Review 88 (1), 180-197.
11. Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of
Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press.
12. Esteban, J. M., and D. Ray (1994). “On the Measurement of Polarization”. Econo-
metrica 62 (4), 819-851.
13. Fieschi, C., and P. Heywood (2004). “Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-Politics”.
Journal of Political Ideologies 9 (3), 289-309.
14. Fishburn, P. C. (1973). “The Theory of Social Choice”, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
15. Grofman, B., G. Owen, and S. L. Feld (1983). “Thirteen Theorems in Search of the
Truth”. Theory and Decision 15 (3), 261-278.
16. Guiso, L., H. Herrera, M. Morelli, and T. Sonno (2017). “Populism: Demand and
Supply”. Working Paper.
17. Hackman, J. R., and N. Vidmar (1970). “Effects of Size and Task Type on Group
Performance and Member Reactions”. Sociometry 33 (1), 37-54.
18. Hawkins, K. A., and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). “The Ideational Approach to
Populism”. Latin American Research Review 52 (4), 513-528.
19. Jensen, T. (2009). “Electoral Competition when Candidates are Better Informed
than Voters”. EPRU Working Paper Series, No. 2009-06.
20. Kartik, N., and R. Preston McAfee (2007). “Signaling Character in Electoral Com-
petition”. The American Economic Review 97 (3), 852-870.
21. Kessler, A. S. (2005). “Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Infor-
mational Asymmetries”. Public Choice 122 (1-2), 9-38.
77
22. Lepelley, D. (1996). “Constant Scoring Rules, Condorcet Criteria and Single-Peaked
Preferences”. Economic Theory 7 (3), 491-500.
23. Madison, J. (1787). “Federalist 10” in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay, eds. The Federalist Papers. New York, Penguin [1981].
24. Martinelli, C. (2001). “Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters”. Pub-
lic Choice 108 (1), 147-167.
25. Maskin, E., and J. Tirole (2004). “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in
Government”. The American Economic Review 94 (4), 1034-1054.
26. Matsusaka, J. G. (2005). “Direct Democracy Works”. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 19 (2), 185-206.
27. May, K. O. (1952). “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Simple Majority Decisions”. Econometrica 20 (4), 680-684.
28. Mohrenberg, S., R. A. Huber, and T. Freyburg (2017). “Love at First Sight? Pop-
ulism and Direct Democracy”. Conference Paper.
29. Morelli, M., and R. Van Weelden (2013). “Ideology and Information in Policymak-
ing”. Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (3), 412-439.
30. Moreno, B., and S. Puy (2005). “The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election”.
Social Choice and Welfare 25 (1), 115-125.
31. Moulin, H. (1988). “Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making”. Econometric Society
Monographs No. 15. Cambridge University Press.
32. Ostrogorski, M. (1970). “Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties”, vol.
I-II. Haskell House Publishers, New York.
33. Pauwels, T. (2014). Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany
and the Netherlands. London/New York: Routledge.
78
34. Rae, D. W., and H. Daudt (1976). “The Ostrogorski Paradox: A Peculiarity of
Compound Majority Decision”. European Journal of Political Research 4 (4), 391-
398.
35. Roemer, J. E. (1994). “The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters are
Uncertain About How the Economy Works”. American Political Science Review 88
(2), 327-335.
36. Rooduijn, M. (2014). “The Nucleus of Populism: In Search of the Lowest Common
Denominator”. Government and Opposition 49 (4), 573-599.
37. Rooduijn, M., S. L. de Lange, and W. Van Der Brug (2014). “A Populist Zeitgeist?
Programmatic Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe”. Party Politics
20 (4), 563-575.
38. Santerre, R. E. (1989). “Representative versus Direct Democracy: Are There Any
Expenditure Differences?”. Public Choice 60 (2), 145-154.
39. Sanz, C. (2015). “Direct Democracy and Government Size: Evidence from Spain”.
Job-Market Paper, Princeton University, NJ.
40. Schultz, C. (1996). “Polarization and Inefficient Policies”. Review of Economic
Studies 63 (2), 331-343.
41. Schultz, C. (2002). “Policy Biases with Voters’ Uncertainty about the Economy and
the Government”. European Economic Review 46 (3), 487-506.
42. Siéyès, A. (1789). “Dire de l’Abbé Siéyès sur la Question du Véto Royal”. Versailles,
Baudoin, Imprimeur de l’Assemblé e Nationale.
43. Skowron, P., P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko (2019). “Axiomatic Characterization of
Committee Scoring Rules”. Journal of Economic Theory 180, 244-273.
44. Slater, P. E. (1958). “Contrasting Correlates of Group Size”. Sociometry 21 (2),
129-139.
79
45. Smith, J. H. (1973). “Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate”. Econo-
metrica 41 (6), 1027-1041.
46. Young, H. P. (1975). “Social Choice Scoring Functions”. SIAM Journal on Applied
Mathematics 28 (4), 824-838.
80
